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An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe 
Steven G. Calabresi∗ & Lena M. Barsky∗∗ 
This Article offers a defense of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plyler 
v. Doe based on the original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it was enacted in 1868. We argue that at that time, 
the Fourteenth Amendment granted certain rights, such as life, liberty, 
and possession of personal property, to immigrants under the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses, but did not grant them the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship (e.g. all civil rights and the political right 
to vote). We also argue that public education is a right of all persons 
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and was 
protected at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. We 
thus conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment granted a free public 
school education to both citizens and immigrants from July 9, 
1868,  onward.  
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“I submit that, when it declares that no State shall deprive any person 
of the equal protection of the laws, it means substantially that no person 
shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit of the laws; that the word 
‘protection,’ as there used, means not simply the protection of the person 
from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, but it is 
substantially in the sense of the equal benefit of the law . . . .”1 
“The object of a Constitution is not only to confer power upon the 
majority, but to restrict the power of the majority and to protect the 
rights of the minority.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe that state laws and 
regulations that discriminated against illegal aliens should be subject 
to the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause.3 In Plyler, 
a group of Mexican children who had illegally entered the United 
States with their families and who were living in Texas “complained of 
the exclusion . . . from the public schools of the Tyler Independent 
School District.”4 These children had been excluded from a free 
public-school education under a May 1975 revision to Texas’s 
education laws,5 which allowed local school districts to “deny 
enrollment in their public schools to children not ‘legally admitted’ to 
the country.”6 The Court held, in an opinion written by Justice 
Brennan, “If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children 
the free public education that it offers to other children residing within 
its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers 
some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.”7 In 
other words, the children’s status as illegal aliens did not, by itself, 
afford the State a sufficient rational basis for denying them the benefit 
 
 1. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (statement of Sen. Morton, R-IN). 
 2. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Hotchkiss, R-NY). 
 3. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 4. Id. at 206. 
 5. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1995) (repealed 1995) (current version at 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001), declared unconstitutional by Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202  (1982). 
 6. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981) 
(repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001)). 
 7. Id. at 230. 
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of a public school education that was afforded as of right to other 
children in Texas who were not illegal aliens.8 
The Supreme Court said that no national policy goals were served 
by allowing Texas to deny children who were illegal aliens an 
elementary school education and that the statute did not further any 
substantial state goal.9 With Plyler, as with other cases discussed in this 
Article, the Court essentially followed a Lochnerian approach to the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though it used the post-New Deal 
rational basis test and the concept of “strict scrutiny.” The Court has 
decided other cases regarding the rights of aliens (noncitizens) against 
state governments along similar lines.10 Our goal here is to determine 
if Plyler v. Doe and other U.S. Supreme Court precedents dealing with 
discrimination by the states on the basis of alienage are consistent with 
the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was 
understood when it was ratified in 1868. 
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that has 
been championed by the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia,11 Justice Clarence Thomas, former Judge Robert H. Bork,12 
and former Attorney General Edwin Meese III.13 Professor Calabresi 
has also commented on originalism in a law review article titled 
Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,14 and our comments here draw 
on and paraphrase that article in various places.  
 
 8. See id. at 228–30. A note on verbiage: In using the term “illegal alien,” we do not 
mean to disparage these children in any way and are merely following both popular word usage 
and the language used in Plyler. We reject that term and its negative connotations; however, 
because of the historical documents and case law quoted in this Article, we must use the term to 
some extent. In using the phrase “illegal alien,” we do not intend to offend any of our readers, 
and we ourselves favor immigration reform. 
 9. Id. at 227–28. 
 10. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 
88 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Part IV, we analyze these 
cases using the same originalist theory applied to Plyler v. Doe. 
 11. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (1997). 
 12. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990). 
 13. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER 
CENTURY OF DEBATE 99, 99–109 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
 14. Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1393. 
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Originalism posits that the constitutional text should be 
interpreted according to the original public meaning of the words 
when the Constitution, or its amendments, were ratified. Since the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that we determine 
what the amendment meant objectively to reasonable readers of 
American English in 1868. This “original public meaning” can be 
uncovered by looking at dictionaries, grammar books, and other 
benchmarks of objective public meaning that were publicly available 
in 1868.15  
Many critics of originalism, such as Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, 
Jack Balkin, and Michael Klarman, claim that a key weakness of the 
Scalia-Thomas theory of judging is its supposed inability to explain 
and justify a number of post-1954 foundational Fourteenth 
Amendment cases.16 Among the Fourteenth Amendment cases that 
originalism allegedly cannot explain are Brown v. Board of Education;17 
Loving v. Virginia;18 United States v. Virginia19 (more commonly 
known as the VMI sex discrimination case); and Trimble v. Gordon,20 
which applied the Equal Protection Clause to classifications based on 
illegitimacy. These cases all grew out of the famous “footnote four” in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co.21 In that case, the Supreme 
Court repudiated Lochnerian-style judicial activism22 except when it 
 
 15. See supra notes 11–13. 
 16. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); 
see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995). 
 17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 19. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 20. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 21. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 22. During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court balanced civil rights, like liberty of 
contract, against the state governments’ police power to pass just laws for the general good of 
the people. The Supreme Court asked in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), whether a 
sixty-hour workweek limitation imposed on bakers was reasonable given the health hazards 
associated with being a baker.  The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that the New York 
law was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. Id. 
In 1938, in Caroline Products, the Supreme Court declared that henceforth it would not ask if 
economic or social regulation was unreasonable but only whether it had some “rational basis.” 
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was protecting (1) rights secured in the federal Bill of Rights; (2) 
rights of discrete and insular minorities who were the victims of 
prejudice; and (3) access to the democratic process. It has long been 
assumed that federal judicial protection of discrete and insular 
minorities who are not U.S. citizens—like illegal aliens—is a form of 
Lochnerian judicial activism that is inconsistent with the rational 
basis   test and the Constitution. That assumption turns out to be 
deeply   mistaken under our originalist interpretation of the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  
A proper application of Scalia-style originalism and textualism 
shows that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe was 
correctly decided based on the original public meaning of the words 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. We begin our analysis in Part 
I by discussing the historical origins and the original public meaning 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
show that the Reconstruction framers specifically considered how and 
whether to protect illegal aliens in both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. They used great care in defining 
both the differences and the similarities between the rights granted to 
citizens and to illegal aliens during   Reconstruction. 
In Part II, we turn to a discussion of the original public meaning 
of the text of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to show why the 1975 Texas statute discriminating 
against children who were illegal aliens was unconstitutional. We show 
how noncitizens were in fact given Fourteenth Amendment 
protections in the text of the Amendment and why the children of 
illegal aliens have a right to a public-school education today. To 
analyze the text in an originalist fashion, we make heavy use of 
dictionaries that would have been available to the American general 
public in the 1860s. Our argument rests on the textual analysis, but in 
Part III we provide context, by explaining the history of the act and 
amendment, for the word choices of the framers of the 
Fourteenth  Amendment. 
 
403 U.S. at 152–53. From 1938 to 1969, the Supreme Court found a rational basis for every 
law it considered except for laws in three categories, which footnote four of Carolene Products 
held were entitled to heightened scrutiny: (1) state laws that violated a right listed in the U.S. 
Bill of Rights; (2) laws closing off the political channels of change, such as incumbent protection 
measures; and (3) laws discriminating against religious, racial, linguistic or other discrete and 
insular minorities. Id. at 152 n.4. 
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Finally, Part IV addresses other cases in which the Supreme Court 
has struck down state laws that discriminated against aliens23 and how 
our originalist analysis supports those decisions. We do not address 
more recent concerns about federalism as applied to illegal alienage in 
this Article because that debate raises distinct issues that rely primarily 
on the text of the Constitution itself and not its amendments. This 
Article focuses only on the Fourteenth Amendment and state action 
discriminating against aliens. 
II.  THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE TEXTS: RIGHTS 
AFFORDED TO ALIENS 
Scalia-style originalism revolves around the importance of a law’s 
historical origins and the original public meaning of the law’s text at 
the time of enactment. A lawmaker’s intent is not necessarily indicative 
of what the words of a law actually meant to the American people 
when the law was adopted. As Professor Calabresi and Andrea 
Matthews explain, suppose Congress passed a law decreeing that the 
colors of the American flag should be red, white, and blue, but 
members of Congress believed, and intended, that the word “blue” 
actually meant the color “green.” The flag would still be red, white, 
and blue, contrary to congressional intent, because the American 
public would have understood the word “blue” to mean the color 
“blue” and not the color “green.”24 The original public meaning of 
the law—the public meaning of the text when it was enacted—is 
controlling for originalists. 
The difference between original intent and original public 
meaning is foundational to the argument that Plyler v. Doe conforms 
to the original meaning of the Fourteen Amendment. Explaining how 
his theory differs from that of original intent, Justice 
Scalia   commented, 
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and 
gives it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the 
time they were promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described as 
the theory of original intent. You will never hear me refer to original 
intent, because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and secondly an 
originalist. If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the intent, 
 
 23. See supra note 10 for a list of the specific cases. 
 24. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1397. 
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and I don’t care if the framers of the Constitution had some secret 
meaning in mind when they adopted its words. I take the words as 
they were promulgated to the people of the United States, and what 
is the fairly understood meaning of those words.25  
Justice Scalia, after searching for general decision-making rules, 
offered “his Golden Rule for decision making”: 
The words are the law. I think that’s what is meant by a government 
of laws, not of men. We are bound not by the intent of our 
legislators, but by the laws which they enacted, which are set forth 
in words, of course. As I say, until recently this was constitutional 
orthodoxy. Everyone at least said . . . that the Constitution was that 
anchor, that rock, that unchanging institution that forms the 
American polity. Immutability was regarded as its characteristic. 
What it meant when it was adopted it means today, and its meaning 
doesn’t change just because we think that meaning is no longer 
adequate to our times.26 
The rationale underlying Scalia’s theory is, quite simply, that 
lawmaking in a constitutional democracy like ours is a public act. 
Citizens cannot participate in the democratic process or lobby their 
elected representatives if proposed legal texts have secret or private 
meanings that are unknown to the general public. Members of 
Congress cannot know when to propose amendments to a law, and 
the President cannot know whether to sign or veto a law, if the law 
has a secret meaning that can be discerned only by looking at what 
one or a few lawmakers “intended.” It is hard enough to figure out 
what one individual may have intended in, say, a criminal case; figuring 
out what groups of people—like the Reconstruction Congress—
intended is hopeless. We can determine what the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment meant in 1868 and, in a general way, what 
problem it was meant to correct, but there is no coherent method to 
determine what the framers and ratifiers of that Amendment intended. 
The best indicia of the original public meaning of the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are found in the dictionaries and grammar 
books that were widely used at the time the amendment was ratified.27 
Newspaper editorials from that time period may also be used to 
 
 25. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 246 (2014). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1396. 
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recover the objective “original public meaning of a newly enacted legal 
text” and to understand some of the public events that caused 
Congress to propose the Fourteenth Amendment.28 It is important, 
however, to keep in mind that newspaper editorials are, in part, public 
interpretations of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. They can 
be beneficial, but it is important when analyzing the Amendment to 
start with the dictionary definitions of the words that the Amendment 
uses. Dictionary definitions express the social meaning of a word; 
newspaper editorials may perform a similar task, but they may also be 
biased. Conversely, congressional legislative history is notoriously 
unreliable because members of Congress have powerful incentives to 
overstate or understate what the text of a particular proposed 
act  means. 
We begin here by analyzing the text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment using Noah Webster’s authoritative American Dictionary 
of the English Language. Webster published the first edition of his 
dictionary in 1828, after taking nearly twenty years to finish it.29 The 
volume contained 70,000 words and included 40,000 more 
definitions than had ever before been published in an English 
dictionary.30 The edition we use to deduce the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s original public meaning is one published in 1848—five 
years after Webster’s death in 1843—by Chauncey A. Goodrich, a 
professor at Yale University, who changed the dictionary only slightly, 
in accordance with Webster’s own plans: “[T]o present, on a reduced 
scale, a clear, accurate, and full exhibition of the American Dictionary 
in all its parts,” to “[make] it a Synonymous Dictionary,” and to 
update the definitions surrounding words relating to art and science.31 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Joshua Lawrence Eason, Dictionary-Making in the English Language, 5 PEABODY J. 
EDUC., 347, 352 (1928). 
 30. Id. 
 31.  NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at iii 
(Chauncey A. Goodrich ed., 1848). Goodrich writes in his preface: 
The plan of this abridgement, as made under the author’s direction in 1829, by 
Joseph E. Worcester, Esq., of Cambridge, Mass., is thus stated in the original preface: 
‘The leading and most etymologies, as given in the quarto edition, are here retained. 
The definitions remain unaltered, except by an occasional compression in their 
statement. All the significations of words as exhibited in the larger work are here 
retained, but the illustrations and authorities are generally omitted. In doubtful or 
contested cases, however, they are carefully retained.’ In accordance with this plan, 
Dr. Webster directed the additions and alterations of the larger work, in the edition 
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It may seem that, due to the Civil War and the immense amount of 
upheaval it brought to the country, definitions would have changed 
between 1848 and 1866, when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was 
passed and the process of drafting the Fourteenth Amendment 
began.32 This claim, however, is unfounded—three different versions 
of Webster’s dictionary—1828, 1848, and 1867—all define the word 
“person,”33 a critical word in the Fourteenth Amendment, in the same 
way, indicating continuity in definitions between 1848 and 1866.34  
 
of 1840, to be inserted in this abridgment. This was done at the time, as far as possible, 
by means of an appendix; and is now more perfectly accomplished by carrying all the 
improvements then made into their proper places in the body of the work. The 
subsequent improvements of the larger work, down to the period of the author’s 
death, have also been introduced, in substance, to this edition, under the heads to 
which they belong. The present revision has been extended equally to both the works, 
and the results have been embodied in each, on the principles stated above, in their 
due proportion. By these successive revisions a very great amount of valuable matter 
has been added to this abridgement. It is now made, in all important respects, 
consistent with the larger work, and is designed to present, on a reduced scale, a clear, 
accurate, and full exhibition of the American Dictionary in all its parts. 
One new feature is now added to this volume, by making it a Synonymous 
Dictionary. . . . Under each of the important words, all others having the same general 
signification are arranged together, except in cases where they have been previously 
exhausted in framing the definitions. This arrangement, it is hoped, will be found of 
frequent use even to those practiced in composition; while it will afford important aid 
to young writers in attaining grace, variety, and copiousness of diction. 
The chief value of a dictionary consists in its definitions,—in giving a clear, full, 
and accurate exhibition of all the various shades of meaning which belong, by 
established usage, to the words of a language. It is in this respect especially, that Dr. 
Webster’s Dictionary has been generally considered superior to every other, both of 
this country and of England. To this point, therefore, the labors of the editor have 
been mainly directed. No efforts have been spared to obtain the most recent and 
valuable works, not only in lexicography, but in the various departments of art and 
science embraced in the American Dictionary. As these subjects are in a state of 
continual progress, every important word, in its various applications, has been 
diligently examined and compared with the statements made on each topic by the 
latest and most approved authorities. 
Id. 
 32. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1425. 
 33. We chose to compare the word “person” because it is the word most crucial to our 
originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe that the framers’ choice to use the 
word “person,” as opposed to “citizen” or some other specific word, extends the rights afforded 
under the Equal Protection Clause to noncitizens as well as citizens, because both are people. 
 34. Webster’s 1828 edition of his dictionary supplies the following definition, in part, 
for “person”: 
1. An individual human being consisting of body and soul. We apply the word 
to living beings only, possessed of a rational nature; the body when dead is not called 
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The full text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.35 
A. Citizenship and the Privileges & Immunities Clause 
The first clause, known as the Citizenship Clause, applies only to 
citizens of the United States and can in no way be construed to apply 
to aliens. We know this because Webster defines the word “citizen” in 
the following manner: 
 
a person. It is applied alike to a man, woman or child. . . . 2. A man, woman or child, 
considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. . . . 3. A human being, 
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. . . . 4. A human 
being, indefinitely; one; a man. . . . 5. A human being represented in dialogue, fiction, 
or on the stage; character. 
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY]. Webster’s 1848 version gives a nearly word-for-word replication 
of the 1828 definition: 
1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A man, woman, 
or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. 3. A human being, 
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human 
being, indefinitely; one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in 
dialogue, fiction, or on the stage; character. 
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 734 (Chauncey A. 
Goodrich ed., 1848) [hereinafter WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY]. And, finally, the definition 
provided in Webster’s 1867 version, which is also remarkably similar, states: 
1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A man, woman, 
or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. 3. A human being, 
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human 
being, indefinitely; one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in 
dialogue, fiction, or on the stage: character. 
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 734 (Chauncey A. 
Goodrich ed., 1867). The word “person” was not the only word examined—all words defined 
using the 1848 edition of Webster’s dictionary were looked up in the 1828 and 1867 versions 
of the dictionary. For the words defined in this article, there is little, if any, change between the 
three different versions of each word. Oftentimes, a definition is expanded upon as time goes 
on, but the meaning of the word defined remains unchanged. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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 1. A native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and 
privileges of the city in which he resides. 2. A townsman; a man of 
trade; not a gentleman. 3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any city, town, 
or place. 4. In a general sense, a native or permanent resident in a city 
or country. 5. In the United States, a person, native or naturalized, 
who has the privileges of exercising the elective franchise, and of 
purchasing and holding real estate.36 
One might point out that definitions two and three could be used 
to describe aliens; however, definitions one, four, and five clearly 
indicate that Webster, and, as such, the American public as a whole, 
would have understood the word “citizen” in 1868 to apply only to 
an individual born in (or naturalized by) the United States. People 
continue to understand the word that way even today. There is a key 
difference between the word “citizen” and the word “inhabitant,” 
which Webster uses both in his first and third definitions of the word 
“citizen.” Webster defines an “inhabitant” as 
 1. A dweller; one who dwells or resides permanently in a place, or 
who has a fixed residence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger 
or visitor. 2. One who has a legal settlement in a town, city, 
or  parish.37 
 
 36. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 177. The definition of “citizen” as 
given by Webster’s 1828 dictionary is: 
1. The native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges 
of the city in which he resides; the freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, 
or one not entitled to its franchises. 2. A townsman; a man of trade; not a gentleman. 
3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any place. 4. In a general sense, a native or permanent 
resident in a city or country; as in the citizens of London or Philadelphia; the citizens 
of the United States. 5. In the U. States, a person, native, or naturalized, who has the 
privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to 
vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
 37. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 542. The 1828 Webster definition is: 
A dweller; one who dwells or resides permanently in a place, or who has a fixed 
residence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger or visitor; as the inhabitant of a 
house or cottage; the inhabitants of a town, city, county or state. So brute animals are 
inhabitants of the regions to which their natures are adapted; and we speak of spiritual 
beings, as inhabitants of heaven. 2. One who has a legal settlement in a town, city or 
parish. The conditions or qualifications which constitute a person an inhabitant of a 
town or parish, so as to subject the town or parish to support him, if a pauper, are 
defined by the statutes of different governments or states. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
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The word “inhabitant” thus denotes the physical action of living 
somewhere on a permanent basis, but it did not apply only to citizens 
in 1868. Travelers on a lengthy, yearlong vacation in the United States 
are denizens, or inhabitants of the United States, even though they 
are not citizens. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation made “all 
of the free inhabitants” of the United States citizens—“paupers, 
vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted.”38 It is for this reason 
that in five of the original thirteen states, free African Americans were 
citizens and could vote. The generous language of the Articles of 
Confederation about extending citizenship to all free inhabitants was 
dropped in the Constitution, which gave Congress the power to pass 
naturalization laws. 
A citizen is usually an inhabitant of his or her nation, although 
some U.S. citizens may and do live abroad for a period of time. Thus, 
“inhabitants” of the United States may also be U.S. citizens, but only 
if they were born in the United States or naturalized by the U.S. 
government. Inhabitants of the United States may well be foreigners 
and noncitizens. Had the Fourteenth Amendment used the word 
“inhabitant,” in place of the word “citizen,” Section 1 could have 
included aliens in the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.39 Instead, the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
says, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”40 Thus, it is 
clear that aliens have no protection under either the Citizenship 
Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The “privileges or immunities” granted to native-born 
or naturalized Americans simply do not apply to aliens. In fact, 
Webster himself drives this point home, defining the word alien as 
 
 38.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV. 
 39. For further discussion of this idea, see infra Part II. The Articles of Confederation, in 
fact, used the word “inhabitants” in its prototypical Privileges and Immunities Clause, which 
most probably was intended to include noncitizens living in the states at the time of its framing 
and ratification. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. The Clause reads 
in part: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
people of the different States of this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, 
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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“[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to, another country; one 
who is not entitled to the privileges of a citizen.”41 As such, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause cannot be used to defend the children 
of illegal aliens in Plyler v. Doe. 
B. Due Process and Equal Protection for “[A]ny [P]erson” 
The second sentence of Section 1, however, contains two clauses 
that protect all “persons” and are thus relevant to aliens or 
noncitizens. Both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly apply to all persons, and 
thus the cornerstone of our argument throughout this Article will be 
that those clauses confer upon alien children the right to a public-
school education recognized in Plyler v. Doe. This text provides that 
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”42 Webster’s dictionary 
defines the word “any,” which appears in both the Due Process Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause as “1. One, indefinitely. 2. Some; an 
indefinite number, plurally. 3. Some; an indefinite quantity; a small 
portion. 4. It is often used as a substitute, the person or thing being 
understood. It is used in opposition to none.”43 
As Webster’s definitions illustrate, the word “any” in the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses indicates a degree of 
indefiniteness. Likewise, “anything” is a modern-day compound word 
that, defined loosely, means “a wide range of things” (e.g., “Billy 
loved his dog more than anything in the world”); “anywhere” refers 
to some sort of unspecified location (e.g., “Bored to tears, Lisa wanted 
 
 41. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 28. Webster’s 1828 dictionary 
provides the following definition: “[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to, another country; 
one who is not a denizen, or entitled to the privileges of a citizen.” WEBSTER, 1828 
DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 43. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 48. The definition in 1828, as 
provided by Webster’s dictionary, was: 
1. One indefinitely. . . . 2. Some; an indefinite number, plurally; for though the 
word is formed from one, it often refers to many. Are there any witnesses present? 
The sense seems to be a small, uncertain number. 3 Some; an indefinite quantity; a 
small portion. . . . 4. It is often used as a substitute, the person or thing being 
understood. . . . It is used in opposition to none. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
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to be anywhere but her cubicle”).44 When the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses use the word “any” to modify the word “person,” 
it has that same indefinite connotation. States may not deprive just 
one type of person life, liberty, and property, nor may they deny just 
one type of person the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses apply to every single type of person—any 
person—as opposed to only certain types of people. Illegal aliens and 
their children fall under the broad category of “every single type of 
person,” and as such states must give them the protections of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection   Clauses. 
The key distinction between the Citizenship and Privileges or 
Immunities Clauses and the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses is that the latter two Clauses use the word person rather than 
citizen. Webster defines the word “person” in the following 
(painstakingly detailed) manner: 
 1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A 
man, woman, or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct 
from them. 3. A human being, considered with respect to the living 
body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human being, indefinitely; 
one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in dialogue, 
fiction, or on the stage; character. 6. Character of office.—7. 
Formerly, the parson or minster of a parish.—8. In grammar, the 
subject of a verb; the agent that performs, or the patient that suffers, 
any thing affirmed by a verb; as, I, thou, he. Also, that modification 
of the verb which is used in connection with the subject.—9. In law, 
an artificial person is a corporation or body politic.—In person, by 
one’s self; with bodily presence; not by representative.45 
 
 44. The New Oxford American Dictionary gives the following definition for “anything”: 
[usu. with negative or in questions] used to refer to a thing, no matter what: 
nobody was saying anything | have you found anything? | he inquired whether there was 
anything he could do. • [without negative] used for emphasis: I was ready for anything. 
• used to indicate a range: he trains anything from seven to eight hours a day. 
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 71 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d 
ed. 2010). The same dictionary gives the following for “anywhere”: 
[usu. with negative or in questions] in or to any place: he couldn’t be found 
anywhere. . . . [without negative] used for emphasis: I could go anywhere in the 
world. . . . used to indicate a range: this iron garden seat dates anywhere from 1890 
to 1920 | she could have been anywhere between twenty-five and forty. 
Id. 
 45. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 734. See supra note 34 for definitions 
of the word in both 1828 and 1864 according to Webster’s dictionaries published in those years. 
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Aliens resident in the United States are not citizens, but they are 
without question persons under Webster’s definition of the word 
person, which includes: (1) “individual human beings,” (2) “man, 
woman, or child,” and (3) “human being[s], considered with respect 
to the living body.”46 Since aliens, legal or illegal, qualify as people 
under Webster’s 1848 definition, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
apply to aliens and applied to them in 1868 when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified. 
C. The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause 
Now that we know that the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to aliens, 
we must parse the text of those Clauses to fully understand their 
significance. The Due Process Clause says that no state shall “deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”47 
Let’s begin by looking at the original public meaning of the words of 
this Clause both in a general sense and more specifically in the context 
of Plyler v. Doe. The first important word here is “deprive,” which 
Webster defines as follows: 
 1. To take from; to take away something possessed or enjoyed; 
as, to deprive of one’s rights. 2. To hinder from possessing or 
enjoying; as, “deprived of his blessed countenance.”—Milton. 3. To 
free or release from; [obs.] 4. To divest of an ecclesiastical preferment, 
dignity, or office; to divest of orders.—Syn. To strip; bereave; rob; 
despoil; debar; abridge; divest.48 
This part of the Due Process Clause makes clear that a state may 
not take something away from any person. 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 48. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 282. In 1828, Webster defined the 
word as meaning: 
1. To take from; to bereave of something possessed or enjoyed; followed by of; 
as, to deprive a man of sight; to deprive one of strength, of reason, or of property. 2. 
To hinder from possessing or enjoying; to debar. . . . [This use of the word is not 
legitimate, but common.] 3. To free or release from. 4. To divest of an ecclesiastical 
preferment, dignity, or office; to divest of orders; as a bishop, prebend or vicar. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
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Next, we need to define exactly what the states may not deprive 
any person of. The first item mentioned by the Due Process Clause is 
“life.” Webster’s dictionary defines “life” as follows: 
 1. In a general sense, that state of animals and plants, or of an 
organized being, in which its natural functions and motions are or 
may be performed.—2. In animals, animation; vitality; and in man, 
that state of being in which the soul and body are united. . . . 4. The 
present state of existence; the time from birth to death. 5. Manner 
of living; conduct; deportment in regard to morals; as, an honest life. 
6. Condition; course of living, in regard to happiness and misery.49 
Thus, in the Fourteenth Amendment sense of the word, “life” can 
refer to both the state of being alive and a person’s “manner of living.” 
And, just as the Due Process Clause says that a state cannot deprive 
a person of his or her “life,” a state also cannot deprive a person of his 
or her “liberty.” Webster defines “liberty” as meaning: 
 1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to 
the body, or to the will or mind.—2. Natural liberty consists in the 
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, 
except from the laws of nature.—3. Civil liberty is the liberty of men 
in a state of society, or natural liberty, so far only abridged and 
restrained as is necessary and expedient for the safety and interest of 
the society, state, or nation. . . . 7. Privilege; exemption; immunity 
enjoyed by prescription or by grant: with a plural. 8. Leave; license; 
permission granted. . . . 10. Freedom of action or speech beyond the 
ordinary bounds of civility or decorum.—To take the liberty to do or 
 
 49. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 595. The 1828 version of Webster’s 
dictionary supplies the following definition, in part: 
1. In a general sense, that state of animals and plants, or of an organized being, 
in which its natural functions and motions are performed, or in which its organs are 
capable of performing their functions. A tree is not destitute of life in winter, when 
the functions of its organs are suspended; nor man during a swoon or syncope; nor 
strictly birds, quadrupeds or serpents during their torpitude in winter. They are not 
strictly dead, till the functions of their organs are incapable of being renewed. 2. In 
animals, animation; vitality; and in man, that state of being in which the soul and 
body are united. . . . 4. The present state of existence; the time from birth to death. 
The life of man seldom exceeds seventy years. 5. Manner of living; conduct; 
deportment, in regard to morals. 6. Condition; course of living, in regard to happiness 
and misery. We say, a man’s life has been a series of prosperity, or misfortune. . . . 10. 
Spirit; animation; briskness; vivacity; resolution. . . . 13. General state of man, or of 
social manners; as the studies and arts that polish life. 14. Condition; rank in society; 
as high life and low life. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
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say any thing, to use freedom not specially granted.—To set at liberty, 
to deliver from confinement; to release from restraint.—To be at 
liberty, to be free from restraint.50 
For our purposes, we can condense this definition down to 
freedom from restraint, freedom to have control over one’s own 
being, and freedom to think for oneself. 
Along with the abstract concepts of life and liberty, the Due 
Process Clause says that no state may deprive any person of 
“property,” a word that carries a more concrete meaning. Webster 
defines “property” in the following manner: 
 1. A peculiar quality or attribute of any thing; that which is 
inherent in a subject, or naturally essential to it. 2. An acquired or 
artificial quality; that which is given by art or bestowed by man. 3. 
Quality; disposition. 4. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, 
and disposing of a thing; ownership. 5. Possession held in ones’ own 
right.—Dryden. 6. The thing owned; that to which a person has the 
legal title, whether in his possession or not. 7. An estate, whether in 
lands, goods, or money. 8. An estate; a farm; a plantation. . . .51 
 
 50. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 594. The definition was remarkably 
similar in Webster’s 1828 dictionary: 
1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to 
the will or mind. The body is at liberty, when not confined; the will or mind is at 
liberty, when not checked or controlled. A man enjoys liberty, when no physical force 
operates to restrain his actions or volitions. 2. Natural liberty, consists in the power 
of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, except from the laws of 
nature. It is a state of exemption from the control of others, and from positive laws 
and the institutions of social life. This liberty is abridged by the establishment of 
government. 3. Civil liberty, is the liberty of men in a state of society, or natural 
liberty, so far only abridged and restrained, as is necessary and expedient for the safety 
and interest of the society, state or nation. A restraint of natural liberty, not necessary 
or expedient, is tyranny or oppression. Civil liberty is an exemption from the arbitrary 
will of others, which exemption is secured by established laws, which restrain every 
man from injuring or controlling another. Hence the restraints of law are essential to 
civil liberty. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
 51. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 787. In 1828, according to Webster’s 
dictionary, “property” meant: 
1. A peculiar quality of any thing; that which is inherent in a subject, or naturally 
essential to it; called by logicians an essential mode. Thus color is a property of light; 
extension and figure are properties of bodies. 2. An acquired or artificial quality; that 
which is given by art or bestowed by man. The poem has the properties which 
constitute excellence. 3. Quality; disposition. . . . 4. The exclusive right of possessing, 
enjoying and disposing of a thing; ownership. . . . 5. Possession held in one’s own 
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Using this definition, we see that “property” meant one’s 
possessions or belongings. As such, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the states could not unlawfully divest any person of his 
or her possessions or estate. The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had all of these definitions available to them when they 
ratified the Due Process Clause in 1868; therefore, the language 
discussed so far says that no state can take away any person’s life (in 
both the sense of being alive and one’s “manner of living”), freedom 
(from restraint, to act under one’s own power, of speech, and of 
religion), or belongings (be they land or other objects), except after 
giving that person “due process of law.” 
While we have examined the text of the Due Process Clause up 
until “due process of law” to understand the words’ original meaning 
in the 1800s, we will not be applying this same analysis to that phrase. 
In 1868, The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would have been thought to embody a legal term of art because it 
imitates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the federal 
Bill of Rights.52 In 1868, many state constitutions also included due 
process clauses,53 and these clauses all descended from a clause in 
Magna Carta, which said, 
 No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his 
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against 
 
right. . . . 6. The thing owned; that to which a person has the legal title, whether in 
his possession or not. It is one of the greatest blessings of civil society that the property 
of citizens is well secured. 7. An estate, whether in lands, goods or money; as a man 
of large property or small property. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. 
 52. The language of the amendment reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 53. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 65–67 (2008). 
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him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his 
equals or by the law of the land.54 
Many state bill of rights in 1868 used Magna Carta-esque 
language to forbid depriving any person of “life, liberty, or estate but 
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”55 This 
formulation was thought to be identical in meaning to the federal 
formulation that forbade any state from depriving any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.56 Deprivations made 
by state or federal law were presumptively constitutional.57 The Fifth 
 
 54. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in MAGNA CARTA: LAW, LIBERTY, LEGACY 
267 (Claire Breay & Julian Harrison eds., 2015). 
 55. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 53, at 66. 
 56. Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Katheryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 
and 1791: What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012). 
 57. Justice Hugo Black explains the philosophy that it is constitutional for lawmakers to 
make deprivations in his dissent in the landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut: 
The due process argument which my Brothers HARLAN and WHITE adopt 
here is based, as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with 
power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court’s belief that a particular state law under 
scrutiny has no “rational or justifying” purpose, or is offensive to a “sense of fairness 
and justice.” If these formulas based on “natural justice,” or others which mean the 
same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not 
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or 
unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is, of course, that of a legislative body. 
Surely it has to be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives 
such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the wisdom and 
value of legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws which they believe 
unwise or dangerous. I readily admit that no legislative body, state or national, should 
pass laws that can justly be given any of the invidious labels invoked as constitutional 
excuses to strike down state laws. But perhaps it is not too much to say that no legislative 
body ever does pass laws without believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise 
and justifiable purpose. While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. 
Madison, and subsequent cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike 
down statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I 
do not believe that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other 
constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that 
legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, 
or is offensive to our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.” Such an appraisal 
of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the 
power to interpret them. The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or 
whatnot to veto federal or state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the 
power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom, and 
transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination—a power which was 
specifically denied to federal courts by the convention that framed the Constitution. 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause was addressed to arbitrary or 
capricious executive or judicial actions and not to arbitrary and 
capricious statutes, as the original Magna Carta clause was written to 
protect against arbitrary and capricious actions by the king’s sheriffs, 
not lawmakers. It guaranteed procedural due process, as the Supreme 
Court suggested in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co.,58 and not substantive due process as the Supreme Court wrongly 
 
381 U.S. 479, 511–14 (1965) (emphasis added) (footnotes and citation omitted). 
 58. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856). The 
case hinged around whether the federal government was in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause when it tried to reclaim funds that had been embezzled from it. Id. at 275. 
The Court concluded that the federal government’s actions were constitutional, id. at 285–86, 
and the opinion is famous for its discussion of the meaning behind the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. Justice Curtis explained the philosophy behind the phrase “due process of law,” 
as first suggested in the Magna Carta, in the following excerpt from the majority opinion of 
the case: 
The words, “due process of law,” were undoubtedly intended to convey the 
same meaning as the words, “by the law of the land,” in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, 
in his commentary on those words, says they mean due process of law. The 
constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the formation of 
the federal constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely, 
generally contained the words, “but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of 
the land.” . . . 
The constitution of the United States, as adopted, contained the provision, that 
“the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.” When the 
fifth article of amendment containing the words now in question was made, the trial 
by jury in criminal cases had thus already been provided for. By the sixth and seventh 
articles of amendment, further special provisions were separately made for that mode 
of trial in civil and criminal cases. To have followed, as in the state constitutions, and 
in the ordinance of 1787, the words of Magna Charta, and declared that no person 
shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or 
the law of the land, would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate. To have 
taken the clause, “law of the land,” without its immediate context, might possibly 
have given rise to doubts, which would be effectually dispelled by using those words 
which the great commentator on Magna Charta had declared to be the true meaning 
of the phrase, “law of the land,” in that instrument, and which were undoubtedly 
then received as their true meaning.  
Id. at 276 (citation omitted). He later says the following: 
Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of 
our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of 
this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to 
be due process of law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances 
due to the government from a collector of customs, unless there exists in the 
constitution some other provision which restrains congress from authorizing such 
proceedings. For, though “due process of law” generally implies and includes actor, 
reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some 
settled course of judicial proceedings, yet, this is not universally true. There may be, 
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suggested in Dred Scott v. Sandford59 and Lochner v. New York.60 It was 
widely understood that a major objective of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause was the complete overturning and 
uprooting of Dred Scott v. Sandford, ensuring that no state could take 
away someone’s life, freedom, or possessions and guaranteeing, as a 
legal term of art, procedural due process for all persons.61 
D. The Original Meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
Our understanding of the Equal Protection Clause may also be 
informed by original dictionary meanings. This is even more the case 
because whereas the Due Process Clause is a legal term of art, the 
Equal Protection Clause is not and thus requires a word-by-word 
analysis of its original dictionary meaning. The Equal Protection 
Clause says that the states shall not “deny to any person within [their] 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”62 The word “deny” is 
defined as follows: 
 1. To declare a statement or position not to be true. 2. To refuse 
to grant; as, to deny a request. 3. Not to afford; to withhold; as, to 
deny aid. 4. To disown; to refuse or neglect to acknowledge; not to 
confess; as, to deny one’s master. 5. To reject; to disown; not to 
receive or embrace. 6. Not to afford or yield.—To deny one’s self, is 
to decline the gratification of appetites or desires; to refrain from; to 
abstain.—Syn. To contradict; gainsay; disallow; disavow; disclaim; 
renounce; abjure.63 
 
and we have seen that there are cases, under the law of England after Magna Charta, 
and as it was brought to this country and acted on here, in which process, in its nature 
final, issues against the body, lands, and goods of certain public debtors without any 
such trial; and this brings us to the question, whether those provisions of the 
constitution which relate to the judicial power are incompatible with 
these proceedings? 
Id. at 280 (citation omitted). 
 59. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 61. See discussion of Dred Scott v. Sandford and the Due Process Clause in PAUL BREST, 
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 250–51 (5th ed. 2006). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 63. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. Webster’s 1828 dictionary defines the 
word in the following manner: 
1. To contradict; to gainsay; to declare a statement or position not to be true. 
We deny what another says, or we deny a proposition. We deny the truth of an 
assertion, or the assertion itself. The sense of this verb is often expressed by no or nay. 
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“Deny” clearly meant the same thing in 1848 as it does today: to 
deprive of, to withhold from, or to disavow.64 If the states were 
forbidden from denying to any persons within their jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws, the double negative of “forbidden from 
denying” means that they had to provide equal protection of the laws 
to any persons within their jurisdiction. 
But what did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment mean by 
“jurisdiction”? This word is significant because the Equal Protection 
Clause only applies to persons within a state’s jurisdiction. Webster 
defines “jurisdiction” as 
 1. The legal power or authority of doing justice in cases of 
complaint; the power of executing the laws and distributing justice. 
2. Power of governing or legislating. 3. The power or right of 
exercising authority. 4. The limit within which power may 
be  exercised.65 
This definition indicates that the Equal Protection Clause applies 
to any person over whom a State may exercise governance: at the time 
of this Clause’s creation in the 1860s, the only persons within a state 
not considered “within its jurisdiction” would have been Native 
Americans.66 Immigrants are not Native Americans, so using the 
 
2. To refuse to grant; as, we asked for bread, and the man denied us. 3. Not to afford; 
to withhold. . . . 4. To disown; to refuse or neglect to acknowledge; not to confess. 
5. To reject; to disown; not to receive or embrace. . . . 6. Not to afford or yield. 
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. We have provided readers with select 1828 
definitions alongside the 1848 definitions to further support our assertion that dictionary 
definitions were not rapidly changing during the period of the Framing and ratifying of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We checked the 1828 and 1867 definitions for each word defined 
in this Article, and none had significantly changed. 
 64. From the modern-day Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, which gives the 
following definition for “deny”: 
1: to declare untrue <~an allegation> 2: to refuse to admit or acknowledge : disavow 
<~responsibility> 3a: to give a negative answer to <~ing the petitioners> b: to refuse 
to grant <~ a request> c: to restrain (oneself) from gratification of desires 4 archaic: 
decline 5: to refuse to accept the existence, truth, or validity of 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 334 (11th ed. 2003). 
 65. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 571. 
 66. For an in-depth discussion of federal and state jurisdiction as applied to Native 
American tribes and tribal land, see our own discussion on this topic, infra Section III.C, in 
which we relied heavily upon Gerald Neuman’s excellent coverage of the issue. GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 171–72 (1996). Note that Donald Trump has 
argued erroneously that children born to alien parents in the United States are not “subject to 
the jurisdiction” of the United States and are thus not citizens. This construction was rejected 
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original public meaning of the word “jurisdiction” in the 1860s, 
immigrants fell “within the jurisdiction” of the state in which they 
resided. As a result, the Equal Protection Clause’s language strongly 
suggests that a state must provide any non-Native American person 
under its governance—including immigrants and the children of 
illegal aliens—with the “equal protection of the laws.” 
We turn now to the core question of what the Equal Protection 
Clause itself means. Webster defines the adjectival form of “equal” 
as  meaning: 
 1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the same 
bulk or extent. 2. Having the same value. 3. Having the same 
qualities or condition; as of equal density. 4. Having the same degree; 
as of rapidity. 5. Even; uniform; not variable; as temper. 6. Being in 
just proportion. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. 8. Indifferent; of 
the same interest or concern. 9. Just; equitable; giving the same or 
similar rights or advantages. 10. Being on the same terms; enjoying 
the same or similar benefits. 11. Adequate; having competent power, 
ability, or means.—Syn. Even; equable; uniform; adequate; 
proportionate; commensurate; fair; just; equitable.67 
It is difficult to synthesize these definitions, but they suggest that 
“equal” is a comparative word signifying that two or more things are 
the same. When used in the Fourteenth Amendment, the word 
“equal” and its connotations can be taken to mean that the protection 
of the laws applies in the same fashion to any person within a 
state’s  jurisdiction. 
The next and most critical question is: what did the word 
“protection” mean in 1868? Webster defines the word 
“protection”  as 
 1. The act of protecting or preserving from evil, loss, injury, or 
annoyance. 2. That which protects or preserves from injury. 3. A 
writing that protects; a passport or other writing which secures from 
molestation. 4. Exemption, as from molestation or arrest.—Syn. 
Preservation; defense; guard; shelter; refuge; security; safety.68 
 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). It is also contrary 
to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which counts as persons, for purposes of allocating 
seats in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College, all persons inhabiting a state 
except for “Indians not taxed.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 67. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 363. 
 68. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 790. 
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With these definitions in place, we see that the original public 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was to provide that no state 
may, within its boundaries, “refuse to grant” to one person the same 
defense, shelter, safety, security, or refuge of the law that another 
person receives. 
Therefore, generally, the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment bars all states from unlawfully taking 
away the life, freedom, or belongings of any person, including both 
illegal and legal aliens. All persons are owed the same defense, safety, 
security, shelter, or refuge under the law as all other persons receive. 
The noun in the Equal Protection Clause is “protection,” while 
“equal” is merely an adjective. The Equal Protection Clause is 
fundamentally about securing the protection, or shelter, of the laws. 
E. Original Meaning and Public Education for Illegal Aliens 
But what does all of this mean for the children of illegal aliens 
seeking to attend public schools in Plyler v. Doe? We already know that 
both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses apply to 
children who are illegal aliens because those children fall within the 
category of “any person” under Webster’s definitions of those two 
words. Yet, the Due Process Clause cannot plausibly be used to defend 
the right to a public-school education of children who are illegal 
immigrants. The ability to attend public school is not “life, liberty, or 
property”—as those terms are used by Webster—and Texas did not 
violate the Due Process Clause when it passed a state statute barring 
children who are illegal aliens from attending public schools. Under 
the Due Process Clause’s original meaning, Texas is perfectly free to 
deprive persons of life, liberty, or property so long as it does so by 
judgment of their peers or by a statute, which is the law of the land. 
The Texas law is unconstitutional, however, under the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause applies to “any 
person” (citizen or noncitizen, adult or child) within the jurisdiction 
of a state. Illegal immigrant children who are in Texas are plainly 
within the jurisdiction of the state of Texas; since the federal 
government has nationalized immigration laws, only national officials 
and not state officials have the power to expel the children from the 
country. The 1975 Texas statute barring the children of illegal 
noncitizens from attending Texas’s public school system violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it gave less protection—shelter or 
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refuge under the law—to illegal alien children than it gave to other 
children in the state of Texas. 
The Texas law was created precisely to single out the children of 
illegal immigrants and deny them the equal protection of the laws, 
withholding access to the public-school system in Texas. There was no 
equivalent law providing an education for the children of illegal aliens 
that Texas could claim was “equal” to its general-public-schools law. 
As such, there was simply no way Texas could claim it was complying 
with the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.69 
Although original public meaning analysis relies primarily, and 
almost exclusively, on a textual reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment also shows that many Reconstruction 
founders would have agreed that the Equal Protection Clause 
supports the holding in Plyler v. Doe. The legislative history should be 
discounted by judges as largely irrelevant to the textual analysis, 
but  it  provides additional support for our original public 
meaning  textualism. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF THE ACT AND THE AMENDMENT: 
CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ALIENAGE 
A. Legislative History Behind the Fourteenth Amendment 
1. Civil rights, “inhabitants,” and the origins of the equal 
protection doctrine 
In 1865, the Thirty-ninth Congress began a series of debates that 
would eventually lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and then to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. These debates 
were prompted by the Northern States’ reaction to both the passage 
in many Southern States of laws that severely oppressed the newly 
 
 69. In arguing that it is constitutional for the children of illegal aliens to have access to 
free public education, we do not mean to imply that these children are constitutionally allowed 
access to all privileges of United States citizenship. For example, we would not argue here that 
illegal aliens or their children should be granted access to welfare benefits. It is constitutionally 
required that the children of illegal aliens be provided access to free public education because 
public education is a right; as will be explained below, in 1868, thirty-six out of the thirty-seven 
states in the Union recognized this right. At that time, though, there was no similar consensus 
on welfare as welfare was considered a privilege. If welfare cannot be viewed as a fundamental 
right, it cannot be mandatory that illegal aliens and their children be granted access to it. 
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freed African American citizens and the election by Southern voters of 
important ex-Confederate officials to high public offices.70 
Northerners believed that these laws, called “Black Codes,” were 
meant to relegate freed African Americans to second-class social status 
by forcing them to live, essentially, as slaves.71 
The North saw the Black Codes as the South’s de facto 
nullification of emancipation and attempt to reverse its military loss in 
the Civil War.72 In response, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois 
introduced the Civil Rights Bill on January 5, 1866, which was from 
its outset a bill designed to effectively override the Black Codes.73 The 
bill was introduced by the president pro tempore as “the bill (S. No. 
61) to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and 
furnish the means of their vindication.”74 When presenting the bill to 
his fellow senators, Senator Trumbull explained: 
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled 
in the insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the 
freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have discriminated against 
them. They deny them certain rights, subject them to severe 
penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions which 
were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery, 
and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under 
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations.75 
Members of the House of Representatives had the same vision. As 
described by Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who introduced 
the Civil Rights Bill in the House: “It will be observed that the entire 
structure of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights 
and immunities made by the States on ‘account of race, color, or 
previous condition of slavery.’”76 Clearly, the Thirty-ninth Congress 
recognized the Black Codes as unfair discriminatory measures and, as 
such, decided to overturn them by adopting a federal Civil Rights Bill 
(which eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1866). Congressmen 
 
 70. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1403. 
 71. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1402 (1992). 
 72. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1403–04. 
 73. Harrison, supra note 71. 
 74. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
 75. Id. (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 1118. 
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wanted to end discrimination, promote equality, and ensure that 
“[t]he states would remain free to create whatever rights they pleased, 
as long as they gave them to all citizens.”77 What is important for our 
argument is not Congress’s legislative intent to establish equal rights 
between black and white citizens but rather the difference, which 
Congress made a point of emphasizing, between the rights the Civil 
Rights Bill guaranteed to citizens and the rights it guaranteed 
to  aliens. 
Section 1 of the bill, as it was first introduced in Congress, read: 
[A]ll persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States, and there shall be no 
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of 
any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of slavery[;] 
 . . . . 
  . . . but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to 
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.78 
The use of the word “inhabitants” was clearly intentional, as 
Senator Trumbull believed that “[w]ith this bill passed into a law and 
efficiently executed we shall have secured freedom in fact and equality 
in civil rights to all persons in the United States.”79 Senator Trumbull 
explained the list of rights that he specifically included in his draft of 
the Civil Rights Bill by saying, “These I understand to be civil rights, 
fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man, and which 
under the Constitution as it now exists we have a right to protect every 
man in.”80 Senator Trumbull believed these rights were held by all 
 
 77. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1403 (emphasis added). 
 78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 476. 
 80. Id. 
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people, not just citizens. However, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, as it was finally passed over President Johnson’s veto, reads: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons 
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the 
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory 
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.81 
As one can see, from the time that the bill was drafted to the time 
it was enacted into law, the focus of Section 1 of the act shifted from 
inhabitants (presumably meaning any person living in the United 
States, including aliens), to citizens, which of course refers to only 
citizens of the United States. In the nineteenth century, aliens were 
“persons” who often had some rights; however, citizens often enjoyed 
other rights that were granted only to themselves.82 The word 
 
 81. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 82. In his 1848 dictionary, Noah Webster defined the noun “citizen” as meaning: 
1. A native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of 
the city in which he resides. 2. A townsman; a man of trade; not a gentleman. 3. An 
inhabitant; a dweller in any city, town, or place.—4. In a general sense, a native or 
permanent resident in a city or country. —5. In the United States, a person, native or 
naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of 
purchasing and holding real estate. 
WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 177. Webster defined the noun “alien” as 
meaning “[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to another country; one who is not 
entitled to the privileges of a citizen.” Id. at 28. And, finally, Webster defined the noun 
“denizen” as meaning: 
1. In England, an alien who is made a subject by the king’s letters patent. He 
can hold land by purchase or bequest, but cannot enjoy office, trusts, &c., or receive 
a grant of land from the crown.—Brande. 2. A stranger admitted to residence in a 
foreign country. 3. A dweller; as, the denizens of air.—Pope. 
Id. at 279. It can be seen that, in America during the Reconstruction period, the word “citizen” 
was commonly understood to mean something different than the words “alien” and “denizen.” 
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“inhabitants” in the draft version of section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
was changed to “citizens” in the final version of the Civil Rights Act 
in order to make it clear that aliens would not be allowed to own real 
property.83 Republican Edward Cowan of Pennsylvania was one of the 
strongest proponents for the change in wording: 
 
Nobody denied that after foreigners were naturalized they could 
purchase land. That is not the question. The question is whether the 
General Government before naturalization can confer upon aliens 
this privilege. . . . These statutes do not provide that a naturalized 
citizen shall not have all the rights of every other citizen, but provide 
what his rights shall be before naturalization, so that the power 
which the United States originally had has nothing to do with 
the  question.  
 . . . . 
 . . . Then, I say again, that by the provisions of this bill, without 
naturalizing the alien, without bringing him within that uniform rule 
which must be adopted before any alien can be naturalized, he is 
made here able to hold lands . . . .84 
Senator Cowan’s concern regarding the use of “inhabitant” was 
based solely on the notion that aliens might be able to own property, 
not that they might have rights at all. Democrat Reverdy Johnson of 
Maryland had the same concern and explained that he interpreted the 
bill in the following manner: 
That is to say, that no State shall discriminate at all between any 
inhabitants within her limits on account of any race to which they 
may belong, whether white or black, on account of color, if they are 
not white, or on account of their having been previously in a state of 
slavery, so that the white as well as the black is included in this first 
section; and if this passes, and we have the authority to pass it, then 
it would be impossible, as I think, for any State in the Union to draw 
any distinction as between her citizens who have been there from 
birth or who have been residents there for any length of time, and 
he who comes into the State now for the first time as a foreigner; he 
 
Citizens could vote and hold real estate, while denizens were “strangers admitted to residence 
in a foreign country” and aliens were “not entitled to the privileges of a citizen,” such as the 
right to vote. 
 83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
 84. Id. at 500 (statement of Sen. Cowan). 
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becomes an “inhabitant.” If he comes from England or from any of 
the countries of the world and settles in the State of Illinois, that 
moment he becomes an inhabitant, and being an inhabitant, if this 
bill is to pass in the shape in which it stands, he can buy, he can sell, 
he can hold, and he can be inherited from.85 
Senator Johnson understood the bill’s basic purpose—to eliminate 
discrimination—and only took issue with the fact that noncitizens 
could “buy,” “sell,” “hold,” and “be inherited from.” Neither he nor 
Senator Cowan raised complaints about aliens enjoying any of the 
other rights listed in Senator Trumbull’s draft; they simply did not 
want aliens to have rights relating to real estate ownership. 
As Professor John Harrison points out, though, “[t]o say that 
aliens were not citizens, and in particular that they could not hold real 
estate, was not to say that aliens were to be treated as outlaws. On the 
contrary, civilized countries extended to aliens the protection of the 
laws.”86 Therefore, while Congress did not believe that aliens could 
own property, aliens were indeed granted equal protection of the laws 
later by the Fourteenth Amendment. This change is foreshadowed by 
section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which refers to the 
protection under the law of inhabitants as opposed to citizens. Section 
2 reads: 
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause 
to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the 
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to 
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person 
having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is 
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not 
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.87 
In other words, section 2 ensures that any individual who does not 
grant an inhabitant “any right secured or protected by this act,” as 
outlined above in section 1, will be punished. Of course, the rights 
 
 85. Id. at 505 (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
 86. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1442. 
 87. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added). 
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secured and protected by the act are only the rights guaranteed to 
citizens by section 1, but the use of the word inhabitants here is in 
tension with the language of section 1, which, as we explained above, 
was specifically modified from its original list of rights granted to 
inhabitants to a list of rights applicable only to citizens. Section 2 
protects all inhabitants from the depravation of their rights in a 
manner different from that of section 1—by threat of a fine or 
imprisonment. This distinction between section 1 and section 2 is 
clearly the beginning of the equal protection doctrine, which has come 
to protect aliens, as well as citizens, from some discriminatory 
state  laws. 
2. Constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
In both the House and the Senate, congressmen debated whether 
Congress had authority to adopt such legislation under the 
Constitution and whether the bill would also convey political rights to 
African American citizens. Some opponents objected that Congress 
had power under the Constitution to enact laws to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery but not to legislate as to civil 
rights.88 Notwithstanding these objections, Congress eventually 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. President Andrew Johnson 
vetoed the act on March 27, 1866, saying, “Hitherto every subject 
embraced in the enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been 
considered as exclusively belonging to the States.”89 President 
Johnson believed the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress power 
to pass laws against slavery, but not laws regarding federal civil rights.90 
The Senate voted to override the President’s veto on April 4th, and 
on April 9th the House followed suit, officially passing the bill as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.91 It was the first time in the country’s 
seventy-seven-year history that a presidential veto had been 
overridden as to an important piece of legislation.92 
 
 88. See Harrison, supra note 71, at 1404. 
 89. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1866). 
 90. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1955); Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1407. 
 91. Bickel, supra note 90, at 29. 
 92. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1408. 
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Supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were afraid, however, 
that President Johnson’s concern that the act exceeded Congress’s 
powers might be thought valid. There was special concern that, if the 
constitutionality of the act were challenged in federal court, the courts 
might strike down the civil rights act as a congressional overreach not 
supported by the Thirteenth Amendment.93 This fear led the 
supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to try to constitutionalize 
the act.94 Thus was born the congressional push for the 
Fourteenth  Amendment. 
While it was still considering the Civil Rights Bill, Congress 
formed a Joint Committee on Reconstruction95 to resolve “whether 
Congress had power to grant suffrage to blacks or otherwise to protect 
black rights under the Thirteenth Amendment or any other existing 
constitutional provision.”96 The first attempt to write a constitutional 
amendment was made by Representative John Bingham of Ohio (“the 
principal drafter of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment”97), who 
proposed to the Joint Committee the language that would eventually 
become Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment on January 12, 
1866.98 This first draft of the Amendment gave Congress the “power 
to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every 
State within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty 
and property.”99 A subcommittee within the Joint Committee 
reworked the text and on January 20 proposed the 
following  language: 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. “The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was at a bare minimum to write the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution so that there would be no possibility of it being 
held unconstitutional or of it being repealed by a later Congress.” Id. 
 95. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988) (comprising, with respect to the committee, “of 
five Republicans—William P. Fessenden, J. W. Grimes, Ira Harris, Jacob M. Howard, and George 
H. Williams—and one Democrat—Reverdy Johnson—from the Senate, and seven 
Republicans—John A. Bingham, Harry T. Blow, George S. Boutwell, Roscoe Conkling, Justin 
S. Morrill, Thaddeus Stevens and Elihu B. Washburne—and two Democrats—Henry Grider and 
Andrew Jackson Rogers—from the House”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1404. 
 98. NELSON, supra note 95, at 49. 
 99. Id. (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF 
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1914)). 
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Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to 
secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same 
political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal 
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.100 
As William Nelson points out, this draft was actually “clear and 
unambiguous” in granting Congress the power to legislate about the 
civil rights of citizens and about the political right to vote.101 The same 
language was used in yet another draft of the Amendment, upon 
which the Joint Committee agreed on February 3: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to secure to citizens of each state all privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. IV, Sec. 2); and 
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of 
life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).102 
Bingham brought this draft out of the Joint Committee and into 
the House in mid-February 1866, while the Civil Rights Act was still 
being debated as a bill. 
3. Congress debates rights granted to aliens 
As with the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the language 
of the proposal that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment 
reflected two important, contemporary beliefs regarding alienage: 
first, that there was a fundamental difference between the rights of 
citizens and the rights of “people,” including aliens; and second, that 
despite this difference in rights, aliens still deserved the “equal 
protection of the laws” to some extent. Bingham explained the need 
to give aliens some, but not all, of the rights of citizens by saying:  
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity of the 
Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether 
citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in 
every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty 
and  property?103 
 
 100. Id. (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 51). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 50 (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 61). 
 103. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
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In the House of Representatives, Republican Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens explained the equality idea behind the Fourteenth 
Amendment as follows: 
 The first section prohibits the States from abridging the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully 
depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any 
person within their jurisdiction the “equal” protection of the laws. 
 I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not 
admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, 
in some form or another, in our DECLARATION or organic law. But 
the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a 
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and 
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far 
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon 
all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the 
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. 
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protection 
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall 
be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in 
court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great 
advantages over their present codes.104 
Another Congressman, Republican Robert Hale of New York, 
viewed the Equal Protection Clause in much the same way: 
What is the effect of the amendment which the committee on 
reconstruction propose for the sanction of this House and the States 
of the Union? I submit that it is in effect a provision under which all 
state legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and 
procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden, may 
be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress 
established  instead. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [R]eading the language [of the equal protection section of 
the amendment] in its grammatical and legal construction it is a 
grant of the fullest and most ample power to Congress to make all 
laws “necessary and proper to secure all persons in the several States 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property,” with the simple 
proviso that such protection shall be equal. It is not a mere provision 
that when the States undertake to give protection which is unequal 
 
 104. Id. at 2459. 
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Congress may equalize it; it is a grant of power in general terms—a 
grant of the right to legislate for the protection of life, liberty, and 
property, simply qualified with the condition that it shall be 
equal  legislation.105 
Members of both the House and the Senate thus agreed that the 
Equal Protection Clause meant that all laws made by the states needed 
to apply to all persons equally, as we argued in Part II.106 Thus, the 
intent of the legislators when drafting the amendment was the same 
as the original public meaning of the amendment: “equal protection 
of the laws” in 1868 meant that all laws were to protect and apply to 
all persons in the same manner. 
However, there was much debate in both houses of Congress 
about how, exactly, aliens would benefit from this bill. As seen in the 
following discourse between Republican Senator Jacob Howard of 
Michigan and Senator Cowan, the main problem with granting aliens 
some rights under the amendment was still the right to own real estate. 
Consider this exchange in which Howard wishes to change the 
wording of Section 1, and Cowan rebuts: 
 Mr. HOWARD. This amendment which I have offered is simply 
declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every 
person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to 
their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen 
of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born 
in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the 
families of embassadors [sic] or foreign ministers accredited to the 
Government of the United States, but will include every other class 
of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes 
all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the 
United  States. . . . 
 . . . . 
 
 105. Id. at 1063–64. 
 106. We understand that if one reads these statements without an understanding of the 
textual history and original public meaning of the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
congressmen’s words may seem to only apply to black Americans (“man of color” in 
Representative Stevens’s quote, for example). We also understand that not every congressman 
during the Reconstruction period held these beliefs. However, we provide these quotes to 
supplement the argument we made in Part II of this article, not supplant that analysis. The textual 
analysis above makes it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was 
applicable to noncitizens at the time of its framing and still today; we hope that this legislative 
history provides an insight into why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote the text 
in such a way that it would apply to noncitizens. 
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 Mr. COWAN. . . . Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in 
California a citizen? Is the child of a Gypsy born in Pennsylvania a 
citizen? If so, what rights have they? Have they more rights than a 
sojourner in the United States? If a traveler comes here from Ethiopia, 
from Australia, or from Great Britain, he is entitled, to a certain 
extent, to the protection of the laws. You cannot murder him with 
impunity. It is murder to kill him, the same as it is to kill another man. 
You cannot commit an assault and battery on him, I apprehend. He 
has a right to the protection of the laws; but he is not a citizen in the 
ordinary acceptation of the word. 
 . . . . 
 So far as the courts and the administration of the laws are 
concerned, I have supposed that every human being within their 
jurisdiction was in one sense of the word a citizen, that is, a person 
entitled to protection; but in so far as the right to hold property, 
particularly the right to acquire title to real estate, was concerned, 
that was a subject entirely within the control of the States.107 
 Unlike Senator Howard, who seems to be particularly opposed to 
aliens in this exchange and wanted to write them out of the 
amendment completely, Senator Cowan recognized that aliens in the 
United States deserved “protection under the laws.” His only concern 
was that aliens might gain the right to own land. 
Representative Bingham believed that his draft of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “would give Congress power to eliminate race 
discrimination throughout the country”108 through both its Privileges 
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses.109 However, 
Representatives Roscoe Conkling and Giles Hotchkiss of New York 
tried to postpone the amendment.110 Hotchkiss, supporting 
Conkling’s original motion to postpone, believed that, while 
Bingham’s goal was admirable, the amendment could not be viewed 
 
 107. Id. at 2890 (emphasis added). 
 108. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1406. 
 109. “Secondly, it is likely that Bingham thought that both clauses of his proposal gave 
Congress power to forbid discrimination. He regularly ran together the two constitutional 
provisions from which his proposal derived, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. 
 110. “When debate [over Bingham’s proposal] concluded, Roscoe Conkling of New York, 
a member of the Joint Committee, moved that the amendment be postponed. In support of 
Conkling’s motion, Republican Giles Hotchkiss of New York explained that Bingham’s proposal 
was not properly designed to achieve its goal.” Id. at 1408. 
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as “permanently securing those rights”111 because it gave Congress 
power to pass civil rights bills but “did not impose a self-executing 
limitation on the states.”112 The Reconstruction framers wanted not 
only to secure Congress’s power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
but to write the act into the Constitution so that no future Southern 
Democratic Congress could repeal it. Congress tried again, and this 
second attempt became the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. Finalizing the Fourteenth Amendment text 
There were two different proposals regarding the manner in which 
the Joint Committee and Congress should adopt the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First, a man named R.P.L. Barber wrote a letter to 
Senator John Sherman of Ohio in which he urged that Congress 
simply adopt the original proposals from the Joint Committee.113 The 
other proposal came from Robert Dale Owen, Jr., a recent immigrant 
and son of a well-known English radical.114 Owen wrote a new draft of 
the amendment, and the new section 1 prohibited “discrimination . . . 
as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”115 The second section “prohibited similar 
discrimination as to voting rights after 1876;” the third section 
“reduced the representation of states if, prior to 1876, they denied 
blacks the vote;” the fourth section “prohibited the payment of 
Confederate war debts;” and the fifth and final section “granted 
enforcement power to Congress.”116 
The Fourteenth Amendment ultimately followed Owen’s draft.117 
His version of the amendment is important for our purposes because, 
as Representative Hotchkiss recognized upon reading the proposal, its 
language suggested “that any new constitutional provision be framed 
as a self-executing guarantee of rights, and not merely as a grant of 
power to Congress to legislate for the protection of rights.”118 As 
Representative Hotchkiss explained on February 28, 1866, 
 
 111. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
 112. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1408. 
 113. Nelson, supra note 95, at 54. 
 114. Id. at 54–55. 
 115. Id. at 55 (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 83). 
 116. Id. (citing KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 83–84). 
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 I understand the amendment as now proposed by its terms to 
authorize Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United 
States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and 
property. I am unwilling that Congress shall have any such power. 
Congress already has the power to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization and uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy. 
That is as far as I am willing that Congress shall go. The object of a 
Constitution is not only to confer power upon the majority, but to 
restrict the power of the majority and to protect the rights of the 
minority. It is not indulging in imagination to any great stretch to 
suppose that we may have a Congress here who would establish such 
rules in my State as I would be unwilling to be governed by. Should 
the power of this Government, as the gentleman from Ohio [i.e., 
Bingham] fears, pass into the hands of the rebels, I do not want rebel 
laws to govern and be uniform throughout this Union.119 
Representative Hotchkiss was specifically concerned that the 
Southern Democrats would regain control of Congress and repeal the 
civil rights laws the Reconstruction Congress had worked so hard to 
pass. According to Hotchkiss, “The object of a Constitution is not 
only to confer power upon the majority, but to restrict the power of 
the majority and to protect the rights of the minority.”120 Owen’s draft 
of the amendment was the only draft that would actually enshrine the 
rights of equality and liberty in the Constitution, where the political 
vacillations and vicissitudes of Congress could not touch them. 
Owen’s proposal was also important because “its first section explicitly 
guaranteed blacks equality of civil rights, and after 1876, its second 
section conferred equality of voting rights as well.”121 There was no 
mention of immigrants or noncitizens but, as explained above, the 
draft did prohibit “discrimination . . . as to the civil rights of persons 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”122 and 
noncitizens (as we argue in Part II) are indeed “persons” who deserve 
the equal recognition of their civil rights. 
Owen’s proposal was changed and made slightly more ambiguous, 
though, when the Joint Committee, “on the motion of Bingham and 
with only two Democrats in opposition, agreed to tack on an 
 
 119. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (emphasis added). 
120.   CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1871). 
 121. Nelson, supra note 95, at 55. 
 122. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 83). 
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additional section . . . onto the Owen proposal.”123 This new section, 
spearheaded by Bingham, was mostly in line with what Owen had 
already proposed: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.124 
This language would eventually become the main text for Section 1 of 
the ratified Fourteenth Amendment. The reason for this change is not 
immediately clear, but Professor William Nelson speculates that this 
section “might . . . have been designed to protect against nonracial 
discriminations, as, for example, discriminations on religious or 
political grounds.”125 Or perhaps “Bingham meant not merely to 
secure an equality of rights, as Owen did, but to protect some rights 
absolutely.”126 His true motivation remains unclear, though, and the 
“additional section may merely have been redundant,” so the Joint 
Committee removed this section from the “proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment by a 7–5 vote.”127  
 How, then, did Bingham’s words, crucial to the security of the 
equal protection and due process of all persons, not just citizens, get 
incorporated into what is now the Fourteenth Amendment? 
As the draft was debated in both houses of Congress and by the 
Joint Committee, Owen’s proposal was modified to remove sections 
2 and 3, which “guarantee[d] voting rights to blacks after 1876 and 
reduc[ed] the representation of states which denied blacks the vote 
prior to that date.”128 Congress created new versions of sections 2 and 
3, which “reduc[ed] the representation of states that did not allow 
blacks to vote” (section 2) and that “barr[ed] many white Southerners 
from the franchise” (section 3).129 These changes were probably 
enacted to address the issue of black suffrage without explicitly 
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 124. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866)). 
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granting former slaves the right to vote, as Owen’s original sections 2 
and 3 had done. 
With Owen’s draft overhauled to such an extent, Bingham saw the 
opportunity to supplant the narrow interpretation of civil rights—
Owen’s draft prohibited “discrimination . . . as to the civil rights of 
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”130 
as discussed above—with his own broader text, which he had tried to 
add once before: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.131 
This time, Representative Bingham’s “motion was adopted by a 
10-3 vote, with a combination of radical and moderate Republicans in 
opposition and a similar combination of Republicans, together with 
three Democrats, in support,”132 thereby making Bingham’s equal 
protection language the new Section 1 of the amendment. The 
diversity of support and opposition for this new version of the 
amendment indicates just how divided Congress was over the issue. 
Those Republicans who voted against the Owen-Bingham hybrid 
probably wanted a greater push for black suffrage, while the few 
Democrats who supported the amendment perhaps recognized the 
necessity of a universal declaration of the protection of certain rights 
for all people. 
Between the first Owen draft and the final Owen-Bingham 
“omnibus measure”,133 the most important (for our argument) change 
was the substitution of Bingham’s equal protection language for 
Owen’s more specific civil rights phrasing. This change “took place 
behind closed doors,”134 so it is unclear why the passages were 
switched; however, Nelson speculates that “the committee decided to 
introduce the concept of due process into section one in order to 
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guarantee that, in regard to fundamental personal rights, state law 
would be procedurally fair as well as substantively equal.”135 
If this is true, our argument gains credence; the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might have added Bingham’s text because 
they wanted to secure fairness in court as well as equality under the 
law for all persons. The new section 1 also included a “provision 
reducing the representation of states that denied the right to vote to 
males over the age of twenty-one.”136 This move can be seen “either 
as a remedy for state violations of voting rights protected by section 
one or as an authorization for the denial of voting rights to blacks.”137 
The contradiction is somewhat confusing, but exemplifies just how 
divided the Thirty-ninth Congress was on the issue of black suffrage. 
Further changes to the omnibus measure included a “new section 
three,” which “deprived all persons who had voluntarily supported the 
Confederate cause of the right to vote in federal elections prior to 
1870” and section 4, which “guaranteed payment of the Union war 
debt, prohibited payment of the Confederate debt, and barred the 
payment of compensation to former slaveowners for their loss of 
their   slaves.”138 Changes also included separating out section 5 from 
section  1.139 
5. Ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment 
The new, combined Owen-Bingham amendment “was approved 
by the Joint Committee on April 28 and reported on April 30 to both 
the Senate and the House.”140 The amendment received mixed 
reactions. For example, Connecticut Senator James Dixon worried 
about Southern opposition to the bill and argued: 
 The amendment proposed is right enough, if the reconstruction 
committee can get any southern State to accept it. But unless they 
do so, it is of course only a shot in the air, which may be right and 
true, but will hit nowhere—unless indeed it falls upon the heads of 
the gunners. Is it not far wiser for Congress to make sure of what it 
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has done; to cry “Enough for this time;” to be content that it has 
secured the supremacy of law and justice in all our territory; and to 
admit at once to their seats all Representatives and Senators who can 
take the prescribed oaths?141 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens, a member of the Joint 
Committee and a congressman very committed to the amendment’s 
cause, had a different take: 
The first section prohibits the states from abridging the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully 
depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any 
person within their jurisdiction the “equal” protection of the laws. 
 I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not 
admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, 
in some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law. But the 
Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a 
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and 
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far 
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon 
all. . . . Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted . . . I need 
not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless the 
Constitution should restrain them those States will all, I fear, keep 
up this discrimination, and crush to death the hated freedmen. . . . 
And yet certain of our distinguished friends propose to admit State 
after State before this [amendment] becomes a part of the 
Constitution. What madness! Is their judgment misled by their 
kindness; or are they unconsciously drifting into the haven of power 
at the other end of the avenue? I do not suspect it, but others will.142 
Despite the criticism, “the omnibus amendment passed the House 
as proposed, but it faced difficulties in the Senate.”143 It stalled in the 
Senate until June 8, when it passed with two more significant changes. 
Section 1 was expanded to contain “a definition of citizenship,” and 
Section 3 was considerably weakened—instead of disfranchising all 
those who had supported the Confederacy, it merely barred from 
federal office those Confederate supporters who prior to the Civil War 
had taken an oath to support the Constitution.”144 The House agreed 
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to all of these changes on June 13, and the amendment was finally 
sent off to the states for ratification.145 
On June 25, 1866, Connecticut became the first state to ratify the 
amendment, and by the end of that year, five more states had ratified 
it.146 Eleven states ratified the amendment in January 1867, and by 
June of that year, twenty-two states had ratified it.147 Finally, by July 
1868, the final six states necessary for passage of the amendment had 
ratified, and despite New Jersey and Ohio’s attempted withdrawals of 
their ratifications, Secretary of State William Henry Seward declared 
the Fourteenth Amendment ratified as part of the United States 
Constitution on July 28, 1868.148 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 59. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 59–60. There has been debate about whether the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified legally due to Congress’s requirement that the Confederate states ratify the amendment 
in order to regain representation in Congress. Bruce Ackerman, of Yale Law School, believes 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in violation of the ratification process laid out in 
Article V. Ackerman argues: 
The facts are these: once the Thirty-ninth “Congress” made its proposal, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was sent to all existing governments of the South as well as 
the North. When one Southern government, Tennessee, ratified the amendment, the 
Republicans immediately admitted its representatives to Congress. But the other ten 
Southern states rapidly rejected the Congressional initiative—often justifying their 
decision by asserting that they had been unconstitutionally excluded from deliberating 
and voting on its proposal. Since there were never more than thirty-seven states in the 
Union during this period, a blocking veto of ten had been assembled. Worse yet, there 
were important pockets of opposition in the North as well. The Fourteenth 
Amendment seemed doomed. 
Until Congress intervened with a series of Reconstruction Acts in the spring and 
summer of 1867. These revolutionary statutes divided the ten Southern states into 
five military districts and placed the Union Army in control of any further transition 
to statehood. . . . After revolutionizing the South’s political class, the acts instructed 
the Army to supervise the election of delegates to constitutional conventions who 
would then offer their proposals for approval by the (redefined) People of each state 
before they were finally submitted to Congress. . . . 
. . . Congress was not content to determine whether the new constitutions were 
truly “republican” before allowing Southern representatives to take their seats on 
Capitol Hill. Instead, it left them out in the cold until “said State, by a vote of its 
legislature elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, proposed by the thirty-ninth Congress, and known 
as article fourteen.” Indeed, even ratification would not suffice. The state would 
remain unrepresented until “said article shall have become a part of the Constitution 
of the United States.” Only then would the bar be raised and military rule be lifted. 
These last two Congressional provisions—enacted over presidential veto—are 
qualitatively different from all that came before. Up to now, it was possible to drape 
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The Fourteenth Amendment was written to address more issues 
than just those regarding equality—it was “an omnibus proposal that 
dealt simultaneously with four of the leading problems of 
Reconstruction: the status of the Civil Rights Bill, apportionment of 
representatives, suffrage, and eligibility of former rebels for state and 
federal office.”149 What has made the amendment famous, though, is 
its second sentence in Section 1, which is derived from both the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and Bingham’s first attempt at drafting the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the amendment in its final 
form  reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
 
a legal fig leaf over each Congressional action. But at this point, we are in the presence 
of naked violations of Article Five. These last two Congressional conditions cannot 
conceivably be justified by the Guaranty Clause, however expansively interpreted—
for the simple reason that Congress had, by this point, already approved the sates’ 
constitutions as republican. Nevertheless it was still asserting its power to keep the 
states out in the cold until they went along with its demand to ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 110–11 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
However, other scholars disagree with Ackerman’s claims. John Harrison of the University of 
Virginia Law School responds to and rebuts Ackerman’s arguments in an article published in the 
University of Chicago Law Review. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001). He says: 
Finally, the southern ratifications may have been effective, despite legal defects in the 
ratifying governments, because those governments had de facto authority and hence 
were able to bind their states. The legal authority of de facto governments is a familiar 
principle of international law that has been followed in American constitutional 
practice, and the Article endorses it in this context. Either the political question [of 
whether the identification of a state’s lawful government is a political question to be 
decided by the political branches of the national government and ultimately by 
Congress] or the de facto government thesis must confront the argument that 
southern ratifications were invalid because extorted through unlawful federal threats. 
The Article maintains that it is doubtful whether the ratifications were so extorted, 
and claims that in any event Article V of the Constitution does not implicitly invalidate 
ratifications made in the face of illegal threats. 
Id. at 375. We agree with Harrison’s scholarship and believe, for the purposes of this article, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed pursuant to the Article V amendment process. 
 149. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1408. The Fourteenth Amendment increased slave states’ 
representation in the House and Electoral College after repealing the three-fifths clause of U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.150 
As seen in the excerpts discussed above, Section 1 distinguishes 
between the entitlements of citizens and the entitlements of persons, 
including aliens. States cannot abridge the privileges or immunities of 
United States citizens, but they also cannot deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process and cannot deny any person, 
including noncitizen aliens, the equal protection of the laws. As of 
1866, aliens were granted due process of the law as well as the more 
vague and novel right to “equal protection of the laws.” Inhabitants 
of the United States who are not citizens may not have the political 
rights of American citizens, but they have had some rights, 
constitutionally, since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 
B. What, Exactly, Does “Within Its Jurisdiction” Mean? 
Before going further, we must address the meaning of the phrase 
“within its jurisdiction” in Section 1’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Current legal scholarship and historical evidence suggests that this 
phrase requires that a state provide fire and police services to any 
person within its borders regardless of citizenship status. First, taking 
the “literal meaning” approach used in Part II, let us define 
“protection.” Webster gives the following meaning: 
 1. The act of protecting or preserving from evil, loss, injury, or 
annoyance. 2. That which protects or preserves from injury. 3. A 
writing that protects; a passport or other writing which secures from 
molestation. 4. Exemption, as from molestation or arrest.—Syn. 
Preservation; defense; guard; shelter; refuge; security; safety.151 
Looking at this definition as well as synonyms, the word 
“protection,” in the Equal Protection Clause, could refer narrowly to 
the provision of some sort of police or fire service as well as protection 
under the criminal and civil law. “The act of protecting or preserving 
from evil, loss, injury, or annoyance” can be construed as police and 
fire services because both crimes and destruction-via-fire can be 
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considered “evil, loss, injury, or annoyance.”152 The synonyms 
“defense,” “guard,” “security,” and “safety”153 can also all be applied 
to police or fire services—police personnel and firemen act as 
defenders and guards on a state’s behalf. Therefore, based on our 
originalist argument, it seems that the idea of “protection,” in the 
expanded sense of “guarding” or “security” and police or fire services, 
can be applied to the Fourteenth Amendment; “equal protection of 
the laws” could be construed as “equal safety” or “equal access to fire 
and police services” within this reading. However, our aim in this 
Article is to address access to public education as a constitutional right, 
not access to fire and police services as a constitutional right. 
As Professor John Harrison argues, when Congress was in the 
process of debating the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, the entire justification 
behind the act came from the Fourteenth Amendment.154 This Act 
“was the third of the four major Reconstruction civil rights laws,” and 
it “was directed at private violence against freed slaves and Republicans 
and at state officials who failed to deal with such violence.”155 Professor 
Harrison explains that “[t]he claim that Congress had power to act 
directly against private outrages like those of the Klan usually rested 
not on the theory that the Equal Protection Clause forbade 
discrimination in general, but on a belief that it specifically forbade 
discrimination in law enforcement—the protection of the laws.”156 
This concept of equal protection of the laws as applied to 
nondiscrimination in law enforcement is seen in the text of the 1871 
Ku Klux Klan Act itself, which reads: 
Be it enacted . . . [t]hat any person who, under color of any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction 
of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, 
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured 
in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or 
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circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same 
rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in 
like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the [Civil Right Act 
of 1866]; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are 
in their nature applicable in such cases.157 
With this act, congressional Republicans “focused on the states’ 
duty to protect life, liberty, and property”158 and attempted to provide 
freed slaves and Republicans in the South with ways to seek justice for 
the discrimination and violence they faced. However, in order to 
protect these racial and political minorities, the Ku Klux Klan Act also 
granted the president (at the time, Ulysses S. Grant) the ability to 
suspend habeas corpus in any state that did not follow the new rules set 
out in other sections of the act: 
That whenever in any State or part of a State the unlawful 
combinations named in the preceding section of this act shall be 
organized and armed, and so numerous and powerful as to be able, 
by violence, to either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted 
authorities of such State, and of the United States within such State, 
or when the constituted authorities are in complicity with, or shall 
connive at the unlawful purposes of, such powerful and armed 
combinations; and whenever, by reason of either or all of the causes 
aforesaid, the conviction of such offenders and the preservation of 
the public safety shall become in such district impracticable, in every 
such case such combinations shall be deemed a rebellion against the 
government of the United States and during the continuance of such 
rebellion, and within the limits of the district which shall be so under 
the sway thereof, such limits to be prescribed by proclamation, it 
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, when in his 
judgment the public safety shall require it, to suspend the privileges 
of the writ of habeas corpus, to the end that such rebellion may be 
overthrown: Provided, That all the provisions of the second section 
of [the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863], which relate to the 
discharge of prisoners other than prisoners of war, and to the penalty 
for refusing to obey the order of the court, shall be in full force so 
far as the same are applicable to the provisions of this 
section: Provided further, That the President shall first have made 
proclamation, as now provided by law, commanding such insurgents 
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to disperse: And provided also, That the provisions of this section 
shall not be in force after the end of the next regular session 
of  Congress.159 
However, it was not this controversial section that would 
eventually cause the Supreme Court to overturn the Ku Klux Klan Act 
in the 1883 case United States v. Harris.160 Instead, the Court struck 
down the act due to the Equal Protection Clause. 
On August 14, 1876, Sherriff R.G. Harris and nineteen other men 
formed a lynch mob and stormed a Tennessee jail, killing one of the 
prisoners.161 Under section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, two or more 
persons were forbidden from conspiring together 
for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person 
or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of 
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from 
giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal 
protection of the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of 
in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the 
due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to 
any citizen of the United States the due and equal protection of the 
laws, or to injury any person in his person or his property for lawfully 
enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal 
protection of the laws.162 
Therefore, at the time of Harris’s crime, he and his conspirators 
violated section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, and the federal 
government levied criminal charges against Harris and his conspirators 
under the act.163 Unfortunately, and quite incorrectly, the Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of Harris, striking down the Act and its attempt 
to provide all persons within the United States with the equal 
protection of the laws.164  
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Justice Woods, delivering the opinion of the Court,165 held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to actions taken by the 
states, not by individuals.166 He based his reasoning on Chief Justice 
Waite’s opinion in United States v. Cruikshank: 
 The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; but 
this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It 
simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by 
the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen 
as a member of society. . . . 
 . . . . 
  . . . [In addition, t]he fourteenth amendment prohibits a State 
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than 
the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add 
anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution 
against another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of 
republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to 
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its 
power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still 
remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is 
to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment 
guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is 
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty. 167 
In his own words, Justice Woods then continued to explain, 
“[T]he legislation under consideration finds no warrant for its 
enactment in the Fourteenth Amendment” because Harris and his 
men were acting as individuals.168 Woods asserted: 
When the State has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when 
it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its 
departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or denied to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, 
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the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by 
its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize 
and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no 
duty and confers no power upon Congress.169 
Unfortunately, because the state of Tennessee, as a single entity, 
had not taken action against the members of the prison—Harris and 
his men stormed it as individual agents—Justice Woods and his 
majority deemed the violent actions unpunishable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. And, because the Ku Klux Klan Act 
attempted to apply Fourteenth Amendment language and philosophy 
to actions taken by individuals as well as actions taken by states, Justice 
Woods struck down the act as a whole. 
Justice Woods’s entire argument in Harris was grounded in the 
fact that the Fourteenth Amendment can only apply to actions taken 
by the states, not individuals, and so the Ku Klux Klan Act was 
unconstitutional because it attempted to apply the Fourteenth 
Amendment to actions taken by individuals. He began his discussion 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by saying, “It is perfectly clear from 
the language of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] that 
its purpose also was to place a restraint upon the action of the 
states.”170 He cited the Slaughterhouse Cases171 as well as United States 
v. Cruikshank as previous Supreme Court cases that also upheld the 
Fourteenth Amendment as applying specifically to the states, and he 
ended this section of the majority opinion by proclaiming, 
 As, therefore, the section of the [the Ku Klux Klan Act] under 
consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private 
persons, without reference to the laws of the states or their 
administration by the officers of the state, we are clear in the opinion 
that it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution.172 
Justice Woods’s suggestion that the Ku Klux Klan Act was 
unconstitutional because it applied its Fourteenth Amendment 
language only to individual actors and not states or “officers of the 
state” is germane to our argument in this Article: if the Fourteenth 
Amendment can only apply to the states, as Woods suggests, the 
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appellants had every right to take Texas to court in Plyler v. Doe. The 
issue in Plyler was an action taken by a state against a group of minority 
individuals; using Justice Woods’s own insistence that the Fourteenth 
Amendment can be applied solely to actions taken by states, reliance 
on the Fourteenth Amendment was appropriate in Plyler because 
Texas was taking action against noncitizen children residing within 
its  jurisdiction.  
Critics of Plyler v. Doe might point out that the noncitizens tried 
in Plyler were within Texas’s jurisdiction illegally, and as such the 
Equal Protection Clause should not apply to them. As discussed 
below, there are two arguments that together refute this line of 
thinking. First, the phrase “within its jurisdiction” was intended to 
emphasize that states were not responsible for members of Native 
American tribes living in the state. Second, at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, there were no formal 
immigration or naturalization laws. 
C. “Within Its Jurisdiction” and Native American Sovereignty 
Professor Gerald L. Neuman explains the complex relationship 
between Congress and Native Americans during the 1860s: 
 The legislative history and the received judicial construction of 
the citizenship clause confirm that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did deny constitutionally mandated citizenship to a few 
categories of children, whom they regarded as not “subject to the 
jurisdiction” of the United States. These were the common law 
exceptions for aliens closely associated with a foreign government, 
and an American addition—native Americans living under tribal 
quasi-sovereignty.173 
Native Americans who lived in tribal societies were “governed by 
their own legal systems” and were “under the protection of their 
tribes, not of the state or federal government.”174 Many Native 
American tribes had both “legal and military independence . . . from 
state or federal governance”175 and, as such, the phrase “within its 
jurisdiction” was included in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
underscore the fact that states were not responsible for providing 
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equal protection under or due process of the law to the Native 
American tribes living within their borders. Native American tribes 
functioned as their own self-governed communities within the United 
States, and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not wish to 
change that. 
The text of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
recognizes that Native American tribes are populations that live within 
the United States but are not administrated by the United States 
government. Section 2, which deals with apportionment of 
congressional representatives and the consequences of denying votes 
to voting-age males, starts with the phrase “[r]epresentatives shall be 
apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed.”176  
At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, Native 
Americans might have lived within a state’s borders, but if they were 
not counted in Congressional apportionment, they clearly had no part 
in America’s political process. To the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Native Americans were their own sovereign nations with 
their own systems of government that lived on U.S. soil. As such, 
Native Americans were inhabitants of the state in which they lived, but 
they were not “within the jurisdiction” of that state. 
The status of Native Americans was hotly contested throughout 
the debates of the various Reconstruction Congresses, and as early as 
1862, it was clear that Native Americans (referred to as “Indians”) 
were separate entities. Representative Bingham said during a debate 
about naturalization: 
Who are natural-born citizens but those born within the Republic? 
Those born within the Republic, whether black or white, are citizens 
by birth—natural-born citizens. There is no such word as white in 
your Constitution. Citizenship, therefore, does not depend upon 
complexion any more than it depends upon the rights of election or 
of office. . . . Gentlemen can find no exception to this statement 
touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the 
Constitution in relation to Indians. The reason why that exception 
was made in the Constitution is apparent to everybody. The several 
Indian tribes were recognized at the organization of this 
Government as independent sovereignties. They were treated with 
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as such; and they have been dealt with by the government ever since 
as separate sovereignties. Therefore, they were excluded from the 
general rule.177 
The sovereignty of Native American tribes was especially 
important during the creation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
Members of Congress recognized that, because of their sovereignty, 
Native Americans neither paid taxes nor were counted among 
the  population for apportionment purposes. As Senator 
Trumbull  explained: 
The Constitution of the United State excludes them from the 
enumeration of the population of the United States, when it says 
that Indians not taxed are to be excluded. It has occurred to me that 
perhaps an amendment would meet the views of all gentlemen, 
which used these constitutional words, and said that all persons born 
in the United States, excluding Indians not taxed, and not subject to 
any foreign Power, shall be deemed citizens of the United States.178 
Likewise, as Senator Doolittle explained: 
Indians not taxed were excluded because they were not regarded as 
a portion of the population of the United States. They are subject to 
the tribes to which they belong, and those tribes are always spoken 
of in the Constitution as if they were independent nations, to some 
extent, existing in our midst but not constituting a part of our 
population, and with whom we make treaties.179 
This notion of interacting with Native American tribes through 
treaty-making also set the Native Americans apart from aliens, citizens, 
or other “persons” falling under the “within its jurisdiction” clause. 
This idea can be seen in the following debate between Senators 
Sumner and Johnson about whether the United States controlled the 
actions of Native American tribes: 
 Mr. SUMNER. Allow me to ask the Senator whether we do not 
always deal with the Indians through the treaty-making power? 
 Mr. JOHNSON. We have done so, but not necessarily. 
 Mr. SUMNER. Is it not the habit? 
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 Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly it is; but I am dealing with it now as 
a question of power. We have dealt with them as a treaty-making 
power, but it is not because there ever was a doubt that Congress 
could deal with them by legislation; and, in point of fact, although 
we have dealt with them as a treaty-making power, we have done so 
by making them make the treaty. It is no treaty-making power in the 
ordinary acceptation of the term; that is to say, the parties are 
not  equal.180 
The United States made treaties with Native American tribes but did not 
control their affairs or have power over their people. In this way, Native 
Americans had sovereignty but no right to vote. Congress recognized this 
and had no plans to change Native Americans’ voting status: 
 Mr. KASSON. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Now, sir, in the history of this country we have excluded certain 
classes generally from taking part in the election. We have excluded 
the Chinese, we have excluded all pagans, we have excluded Indians 
as a general rule, we have excluded white males under twenty-one 
years of age, we have excluded women of all ages irrespective of 
intelligence or tax paying.181 
Throughout the Reconstruction debates there was no question 
that Native American tribes were their own entities, and the 
congressmen involved in drafting and ratifying both the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments did not wish Native Americans to reap 
the benefits that the Amendments provided. The phrase “within its 
jurisdiction” was almost certainly included in the Amendment because 
Native Americans fell completely outside of both state and 
federal  jurisdictions. 
D. Immigration During the Reconstruction Period: No Federal Laws, 
“Legal,” or “Illegal” 
Even though the phrase “within its jurisdiction” was written into 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to demonstrate the 
sovereignty of Native American tribes, it still means that any person 
that a state might have governmental control over is owed both equal 
protection and due process of the laws. As such, critics of this Article’s 
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dissection of Plyler v. Doe might argue that the alien children were 
indeed within Texas’s jurisdiction but were there illegally, so the Equal 
Protection Clause could not apply to them. We think that argument 
carries little weight because at the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was written, there was no distinction between “illegal” and “legal” 
aliens because there were no federal immigration laws.182 
Professor Neuman argues that “considerable regulation of 
immigration existed at the state level; most of it enjoyed a degree of 
federal endorsement; and some of it was backed by federal 
sanctions.”183 However, Professor Neuman does note that “the earliest 
use of the term [illegal alien] that LEXIS or WESTLAW turns up in a 
judicial opinion occurs in Waisbord v. United States, which is itself not 
a masterpiece of decorum. The term undocumented alien is 
even  newer.”184 
That the earliest recorded federal use of the term “illegal alien” is 
from 1950 does not bar the possibility that there existed some 
publically understood concept of aliens who had come to the United 
States in an illicit fashion. And it is true that certain states may have 
had strict immigration policies to protect their borders and regulate 
the flow of foreigners. As Neuman explains, 
[S]tate immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five 
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation 
of persons likely to become or actually becoming a public charge; 
prevention of the spread of contagious diseases, including maritime 
quarantine and suspension of communication by land; regionally 
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varying policies relating to slavery, including the prohibition of the 
slave trade; and bans on the migration of free blacks, including the 
seamen’s acts.185 
At the federal level, though, there was virtually no restriction on 
immigration. “Federal statutes backed up the state quarantine laws 
and state laws barring the importation of slaves or free black aliens,”186 
but, aside from those specialized statutes, there was no real federal 
immigration policy in place during 1866. 
Frank L. Auerbach describes this lack of federal immigration policy 
in his book Immigration Laws of the United States: 
Of the four basic courses a sovereign country can follow in 
formulating its immigration policy—unrestricted immigration, 
qualitative restriction, quantitative restriction, and prohibition of all 
immigration—the United States, ever since 1921, has chosen the 
second and third course by imposing both qualitative and 
quantitative restrictions on aliens seeking to enter the United States 
as immigrants. This period was preceded by some forty-five years of 
only qualitative restrictions and this period, in turn, by more than one 
hundred years of immigration unrestricted by federal legislation.187 
Congress passed the Page Act of 1875 as a “[q]ualitative 
restriction of immigration”188 and did not act again on immigration 
until the Emergency Quota Act of 1921,189 Moreover, for “more than 
one hundred years” prior to 1875, federal immigration was essentially 
unrestricted, back to the time of the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence, the American Revolution, the founding of our 
country, and the framing of our Constitution. Indeed, it was not until 
ten years after the Constitution’s ratification that Congress passed 
“the first federal legislation dealing with” immigration.190 
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While anti-immigrant sentiments were certainly present during the 
period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, ratified, and 
enacted, there were no federal anti-immigration laws passed at the 
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification. Anti-
immigrant sentiment was not officially codified into American law 
until 1875 with qualitative restrictions on immigration and 
strengthened in 1921 with quantitative restrictions on immigration.191 
Both the Page Act of 1875192 and the Emergency Quota Act of 1921193 
were passed well after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification 
in  1868. 
In 1798, during President John Adams’s tenure, Congress passed 
three acts attempting to restrict immigration into the United States: 
the Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Alien 
Act.194 The Naturalization Act195 increased the time necessary for 
immigrants to become naturalized citizens from five to fourteen years 
and was repealed in 1802;196 the Alien Enemies Act,197 which applied 
only during wartime, gave the president authority to apprehend and 
deport aliens if the United States was at war with their home 
countries;198 and the Alien Act199 allowed the president to arrest and 
deport any alien he thought dangerous, but “it expired by its own 
terms in 1800, never to be renewed.”200 Congress passed another 
Naturalization Act in 1802201 that sought “to make registration at the 
time of arrival a documentary prerequisite to later naturalization,” but 
it was widely disregarded and was repealed in 1828.202 
Due to the expiry of the three Acts passed in 1798 and the repeal 
of the 1802 Naturalization Act, “there was no federal legislation 
restricting the admission to, or permitting the deportation of aliens in, 
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the United States”203 until 1875. “Beginning in 1830,” though, “a 
marked anti-alien feeling developed in the United States primarily 
directed against the preponderantly Catholic immigration from 
Ireland.”204 Reacting to this sentiment, Congress considered bills 
“which proposed some of the measures which later on became part of 
American immigration law, principally the exclusion of certain 
undesirable classes . . . and the requirement of certificates to be issued 
immigrants by American consuls abroad.”205 However, none of these 
bills were passed.206 
Instead, states took matters into their own hands because they 
“had to carry the expense of caring for the sick, destitute, or otherwise 
dependent immigrants.”207 Laws such as those passed in New York, 
California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, where there were large 
influxes of immigrants, “provided, for example, for a tax on each 
immigrant, for inspection of immigrants by State officials, and for 
bonds in the case of aliens considered unable to be self-supporting.”208 
These state laws were not passed to restrict the flow of immigration or 
to keep immigrants out of their states (even if there was anti-Irish 
sentiment at the time); they were passed for financial purposes. 
However, in 1875 the Supreme Court held, in both Henderson v. 
Mayor of New York209 and Chy Lung v. Freeman,210 that “the power to 
legislate concerning the immigration and deportation of aliens rested 
exclusively with the Congress of the United States.”211 
Aside from the lapsed statutes, the only federal action taken on 
immigration in the United States prior to 1875 (prior to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification) was the 
Burlingame Treaty executed between China and the United States in 
1868.212 Remarkably, this treaty was not an expression of the anti-
Chinese xenophobia apparent in the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 
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and 1904.213 Rather, its language paralleled the language from the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself, ratified on the same day the 
Burlingame Treaty was proclaimed: “This [treaty] recognized the 
inherent right of man to change his home and allegiance and 
guaranteed to Chinese subjects such ‘privileges, immunities, and 
exemptions in respect to travel and residence’ in the United States as 
might be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most 
favored  nations.”214 
This treaty shows an acceptance (on the part of the federal 
government, not necessarily U.S. residents or state legislatures) of 
certain immigrants living on U.S. soil. It went so far as to grant 
Chinese subjects certain “‘privileges, immunities, and exemptions in 
respect to travel and residence’. . . as might be enjoyed by the citizens 
or subjects of the most favored nations”215! Not only did the 
Burlingame Treaty use language mirroring the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but the treaty was proclaimed on the same day as the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s official ratification. Given how scrutinized, 
debated, and edited the Fourteenth Amendment’s language was 
during its framing,216 the similarities between language in the 
Burlingame Treaty and the newly-ratified Fourteenth Amendment 
must have been intentional. While the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not—and could not—ever apply its Privileges and Immunities Clause 
to aliens living on American soil, for a time, Chinese aliens were 
welcomed with “privileges and immunities” to the United States by 
our federal government. At least through the year 1868, when the 
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, there was no concept of “illegal” 
alienage in federal or state statues.217 
The discriminatory educational policies at issue in Plyler v. Doe may 
have been driven by anti-immigrant prejudice, as xenophobia in the 
United States grew strongly in the years following 1868218 and still 
lingers in our nation’s collective consciousness. However, the laws that 
established a canon of federal immigration policy—the Act of March 
3, 1875;219 the contract labor laws of 1885 and 1887;220 the Act of 
March 3, 1903;221 the Act of February 20, 1907;222 the Immigration 
 
 217. Before 1868, the Supreme Court declared state immigration 
statutes unconstitutional. 
 218. Cf. supra note 187 (briefly explaining the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and 1904, 
which established the deportation of “illegal” Chinese immigrants); infra notes 227–230 
(summarizing the evolution of immigration law in the United States from 1875 to 1924, 
showing that, as the immigrant population in the United States increased, so too grew 
Americans’ xenophobia). 
 219. The Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, grew out of “[t]he lack of any control 
over the movement of immigrants into the United States as a result of the Supreme Court 
decisions and the increasing volume of immigration.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 3. This 
Act was the first of many to have “excluded from admission” certain types of immigrants—in 
this original Act, the excluded classes of immigrants were “criminals and prostitutes.” Id. This 
Act also “entrusted the inspection of immigrants to collectors of the ports.” Id. The Act “first 
established the policy of federal restriction on immigration,” while later acts, such as the Act of 
August 3, 1882, and the Act of March 3, 1891, expanded the list of “classes of inadmissible 
aliens.” Id. at 3–4. 
 220. In 1885 and 1887, Congress “passed the so-called contract labor laws which made it 
unlawful to import aliens into the United States under contract for the performance of labor or 
services of any kind.” Id. at 3. These laws—the Act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, 
and the Act of February 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414—were created “[i]n response to the 
complaints of labor organizations that certain employers were lowering the standards of 
American labor by importing cheap foreign labor.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 3. As one 
may recognize from following current American politics, this “cheap foreign labor” anti-
immigrant argument is still being made 130 years later. 
 221. The Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, “introduced significant new 
features into American immigration law,” adding on to the list of “inadmissible” aliens not only 
undesirables such as “epileptics, persons who had been insane within five years prior to 
application for admission, persons who had had two or more attacks of insanity, and professional 
beggars” along with, for the first time, immigrants with certain political beliefs. AUERBACH, 
supra note 187, at 4. Specifically, the Act of 1903 “made inadmissible ‘anarchists, or persons 
who believe in, or advocate, the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United 
States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials,’” 
thereby delineating certain “proscribed opinions” that the United States did not want migrating 
onto its soil. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214). 
 222. The Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, was created “[a]s a result of a 
further increase of immigration and in response to Presidential messages to Congress.” 
AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 4. The Act “increased the head tax [of 50 cents on each passenger 
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Act of February 5, 1917;223 and the Quota Law of 1921224—were 
passed after the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a result, they cannot be used to ascertain the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because no federal 
immigration law existed at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
framing and ratification, the alien children in Plyler v. Doe could indeed 
be considered within Texas’s jurisdiction and the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause rightfully applied to them. 
 
brought to the United States] to $4.00 and added to the excludable classes” a hefty amount of 
maladies, such as “imbeciles, feeble minded persons . . . persons afflicted with tuberculosis . . . 
and women coming to the United States for immoral purposes.” Id. The February 20, 1907, 
Act “also created a Joint Commission on Immigration consisting of three members of the Senate, 
three members of the House of Representatives, and three other persons, to make an 
investigation of the immigration system of the United States.” Id. This new Joint Commission 
“completed its investigation by 1911 and published its report in forty-two volumes,” which 
became “the basis for the comprehensive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917.” Id. at 4–5. 
 223. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, was “passed as a 
result of the growing demand for more effective restrictions on immigration.”AUERBACH, supra 
note 187, at 6. It greatly expanded the list of “inadmissible classes of aliens” and “codified all 
previously enacted exclusion provisions,” adding a “controversial provision . . . excluding aliens 
over sixteen years of age who were unable to read.” Id. This literacy-specific provision was the 
result of twenty years of buildup as “[a] bill providing for a literacy test for immigrants was first 
passed by Congress in 1897 but was vetoed by President Cleveland and similar bills were 
subsequently vetoed by Presidents Taft and Wilson.” Id. However, the 1917 Act passed despite 
President Wilson’s veto, and it “placed the literacy requirement on the statute book” while also 
adding “further restrictions on the immigration of Asian persons by creating the so-called barred 
zone, natives of which were declared inadmissible to the United States.” Id. Finally, this Act 
“broadened considerably the classes of aliens deportable from the United States and introduced 
the requirement of deportation without statute of limitation in certain more serious cases.” Id. 
Xenophobia was clearly on the rise and growing ever stronger. 
 224.  The Quota Law of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, “represented a drastic change in American 
immigration policy” as it “limited the number of aliens of any nationality entering the United 
States to 3 per cent of foreign born persons of that nationality who lived in the United States in 
1910.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 7. The Quota Law was enacted because of “new demands 
for restriction on immigration” stemming from “[t]he unsettled conditions in Europe after the 
first World War” which drove many European immigrants to the United States. Id. The Quota 
Law “represented a drastic change” in the American approach to immigration policy because 
“[u]p to its enactment, laws restricting immigration were all qualitative in character, in other 
words, they provided that certain classes of aliens were inadmissible into the United States.” Id. 
Under this new law, federal immigration policy not only barred immigrants from entry based on 
these certain classes, it also created “quantitative restrictions by putting a ceiling on the total 
number of aliens whose admission as immigrants was permitted into the United States during 
any one year.” Id. This quota-based immigration restriction would become the new basis for 
American immigration policy in years to come. 
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E. Aliens: Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Since Its Inception 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment may apply to any type of 
noncitizen inhabitant living in the United States, we must examine its 
original purpose as relating to those persons living in the United States 
in 1866. As explained above, the Fourteenth Amendment was written 
to tackle more than just equality—it was “an omnibus proposal that 
dealt simultaneously with four of the leading problems of 
Reconstruction: the status of the Civil Rights Act, apportionment of 
representatives, suffrage, and eligibility of former rebels for state and 
federal office.”225 What made the amendment famous, though, is its 
second sentence, derived from both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
Bingham’s first draft of the amendment, which neatly distinguishes 
between the rights of citizens and the rights of persons. Section 1 of 
the amendment once again reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.226 
As discussed above, the Fourteenth Amendment distinguishes 
between citizens and persons, including aliens. States cannot abridge 
the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens, but they also cannot 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law and cannot deny any person the equal protection of the laws. As of 
1868, aliens were granted due process under the law as well as the 
vaguer concept of “equal protection of the laws.” Some political rights 
are reserved exclusively for citizens, but aliens have been entitled to 
some constitutional rights since the Fourteenth Amendment 
was  ratified. 
Unfortunately, rights were not necessarily granted to every person 
in America after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was 
 
 225. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1408. The Fourteenth Amendment increased slave states’ 
representation in the House and Electoral College after amending the Three-Fifths Clause of 
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2. 
 226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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especially evident in California, where, starting in the early 1850s, a 
large wave of Chinese immigrants came to work in the gold mines, 
settled there, and formed their own communities.227 Californians were 
at first hospitable towards the aliens, but by 1852 they came to resent 
their new neighbors; the Chinese were an insular community, and it 
seemed to the Californians that many of them did not wish to be 
naturalized.228 To force the Chinese out, the California legislature 
levied unfair taxes against the aliens (fees related to work in the mines) 
and enforced them through violence.229 The Chinese found support 
from Christian missionaries willing to help the otherwise ostracized 
community and sought legal recourse by hiring lawyers. But they 
often faced difficulty in courts because, in California, the Chinese were 
not allowed to testify.230 
The California Supreme Court held in favor of the Chinese in 
four major cases related to the discriminatory taxation,231 but 
 
 227. Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century 
America: The First Phase, 1850–1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529, 534–35 (1984). 
 228. See id. at 536. 
 229. Id. at 539, 539 n.52. 
 230. Id. at 541 n.58, 548–49. 
 231. In People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857), the California Supreme Court struck down 
California’s 1855 “Capitation Tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 545. The tax had “imposed on 
the master or owner of each vessel landing passengers incompetent by the laws of the United 
States or the laws and constitution of this State to become citizens thereof a tax of $50 for each 
such passenger.” Id. at 544 (internal citations omitted). In Downer, “it took the justices [of the 
California Supreme Court] less than half a page of the reports to void the measure as an 
impermissible interference with the national government’s power over foreign commerce.” Id. 
at 545. 
In Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861), the California Supreme Court held that “[t]he mere 
fact that [petitioner] was Chinese and living in the mining district . . . did not subject him to the 
foreign miners’ tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 558. According to the court, 
If the act [creating the Foreign Miners’ License Tax] is to be construed as imposing 
this tax, it cannot be supported, any more than could a law . . . which imposed upon 
every man residing in a given section of the State a license as a merchant, whatever 
his occupation. 
Ah Pong, 19 Cal. at 108. 
In Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal. 491 (1861), “[a] Chinese miner brought a replevin action to 
recover a horse that had been attached by the county tax collector to enforce payment of the 
tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 558. Importantly, the plaintiff “claimed, in short, equal 
protection of the laws” because he based his argument on the fact that the Foreign Miners’ 
License Tax “conflicted with article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, which granted 
foreigners who were bona fide residents the same rights of possession and enjoyment of property 
as United States citizens.” Id. The California Supreme Court “chose to decide the case on the 
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discrimination and racism towards the Chinese was still rampant. 
Finally, in 1867, China sent Anson Burlingame, “an American 
minister to the Manchu Court in Peking,” to reevaluate the 1858 
Treaty of Tientsin, the last treaty between the United States and 
China.232 An amendment to the Treaty of Tientsin was signed in 
Washington in July of 1868, which stated that “Chinese subjects 
visiting or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same 
privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or 
residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the 
most favored nation.”233 Despite the treaty, California still levied 
miners’ taxes against the Chinese. When the House Ways and Means 
Committee (along with Senators Benjamin Wade and Roscoe 
Conkling) visited San Francisco in June 1869 and noted California’s 
anti-alien discrimination, Congress realized that the states were 
not following the Fourteenth Amendment and that a change 
was  necessary.234 
In 1870, Republican Senator William Stewart of Nevada 
submitted a resolution for the Committee on the Judiciary to  
inquire if any States are denying to any class of persons within their 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, in violation of treaty 
obligations with foreign nations and of section one of the 
fourteenth   amendment to the Constitution; and if so, what 
legislation   is   necessary to enforce such treaty obligations and 
such  amendment . . . .235  
 
basis of statutory construction” instead of the equal protection argument, but it still ruled in 
favor of plaintiff. Id. at 559. 
In Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862), the California Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of “the respective power of the state and federal governments in foreign trade and commerce 
regulation.” McClain, supra note 227, at 555. The plaintiff was taxed in San Francisco for two 
months under the Chinese Police Tax. Id. The California Supreme Court used “Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in the Supreme Court Case, Brown v. Maryland [25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 
(1827)]” to hold that “[b]y singling out one group of foreigners residing in the state for 
taxation, the California Legislature was discouraging immigration from that land and was thus 
discriminating against foreign commerce.” Id. at 556. In other words, “the court concluded that 
the tax on the Chinese was a tax analogous to a tax that discriminated against imports.” Id. 
 232. Id. at 561. 
 233. Id. at 563 (quoting The Burlingame Treaty, China-U.S., art. VI, July 28, 1868, 16 
Stat. 739, 740). 
 234. Id. at 564–65. 
 235. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1870). 
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The Committee reported on California’s mistreatment of the 
Chinese aliens, which it considered a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, leading Stewart to propose what would become the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870: “a bill . . . to secure to all persons the equal 
protection of the laws.”236 The importance of this Act cannot be 
overstated, especially for our thesis, because it was spurred by the 
mistreatment of aliens, not citizens, and its purpose was to ensure that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was applied properly to all persons. 
The first proposed text of what would become the 1870 Act read 
as follows: 
 Be it enacted, &:c., That all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, Indians not taxed excepted, shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom to the contrary notwithstanding. No tax or charge shall be 
imposed or enforced by any State upon any person emigrating 
thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed and 
enforced upon every person emigrating to such State from any other 
foreign country, and any law of any State in conflict with this 
provision is hereby declared null and void. 
 SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under 
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or 
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this 
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of 
such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is 
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, 
or both, in the discretion of the court. 
 SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all 
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the 
means of their vindication, passed April 9, 1886, is hereby reenacted, 
 
 236. Id. at 323. 
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and said act, except the first and second sections thereof, is hereby 
referred to and made a part of this act.237 
The text is very similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, with three 
major differences. The first is the use of the phrase “all persons within 
the jurisdiction of the United States”—as we have already explained, 
there was a clear difference between the original public meaning of 
the words “persons,” “inhabitants,” and “citizens.” The 1866 Act’s 
original draft used inhabitants, as shown above, and the final Act gives 
only citizens the rights listed in section 1. The Fourteenth 
Amendment uses “citizens” in one instance and “persons” in another 
to emphasize that there are rights granted to U.S. citizens not afforded 
to aliens. The use of “persons” here is intentional and is a clear 
indicator that this bill was drafted to protect aliens. 
The second difference is the inclusion at the end of section 1 of 
the sentence:  
No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any 
person emigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not 
equally imposed and enforced upon every person emigrating to such 
State from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in 
conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void.238 
This phrase is likely aimed at California, which, as previously 
discussed, was unfairly taxing its Chinese alien inhabitants. It applies 
to all states, though, and can, in a way, be read as a modified equal 
protection clause. It says that a state may not impose a tax on a certain 
group of aliens unless all aliens in the state are taxed equally. It is not 
quite the same as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause because it only necessitates equality among aliens, not among 
all persons; however, the wording and the concept of equal taxation 
for all aliens implies that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
logic applies to the situation. 
The final, most important difference between the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870 is the new phrase “[t]hat all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, Indians not taxed 
excepted, shall have the same right . . . to the full and equal benefit of 
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is 
 
 237. Id. at 1536. 
 238. Id. (statement of Sen. Stewart). 
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enjoyed by white citizens.”239 Webster defines “benefit” as “1. An act 
of kindness; a favor conferred. 2. That which is useful or beneficial; a 
word of extensive use, and expressing whatever contributes to 
promote prosperity and happiness. . . SYN. Advantage; profit; service; 
use; avail.”240 Therefore, the 1870 Act’s full-and-equal-benefit-of-the-
laws concept goes further than just the “equal protection of the laws” 
laid out in the Fourteenth Amendment: the Civil Rights Act of 1870 
grants to all persons both equal protection and the “full and equal 
use  of the laws.” Under the 1870 Act, the laws applied to all 
persons  equally. 
Unsurprisingly, there was debate in Congress about whether the 
law would grant aliens the right to own real estate: 
 Mr. POMEROY. I have not examined this bill, and I desire to ask 
the Senator from Nevada a question. I understood him to say that 
this bill gave the same civil rights to all persons in the United States 
which are enjoyed by citizens of the United States. Is that it? 
 Mr. STEWART. No; it gives all the protection of the laws. If the 
Senator will examine this bill in connection with the original civil 
rights bill, he will see that it has no reference to inheriting or holding 
real estate. 
 Mr. POMEROY. That is what I was coming to. 
 Mr. STEWART. The civil rights bill had several other things 
applying to citizens of the United States. This simply extends to 
foreigners, not citizens, the protection of our laws where the State 
laws deny them the equal civil rights enumerated in the first section. 
 Mr. POMEROY. They have the same civil rights in that regard. 
Does the property of a foreigner dying here descend under our laws? 
Most of the States appoint a public administrator who administers 
upon the estates of foreigners differently from what he does on the 
estates of citizens. Does this interfere with that? 
 Mr. STEWART. I think not. 
 Mr. POMEROY. Foreigners are not allowed to petition the 
Senate. If the bill passes, will the petitions of foreigners be 
received  here? 
 Mr. STEWART. . . . 
 
 239.   Id. (emphasis added).  
 240. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 115. 
225  An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe 
 293 
 . . . 
 It has nothing to do with property or descent. We left that part 
of the law out; but it gives protection to life and property here. The 
civil rights bill, then, will give the United States courts jurisdiction 
to enforce it. 
 Mr. POMEROY. I am undoubtedly in favor of the object of the 
bill. I wanted to see how far the Senator was willing to go. So far as 
the bill goes I think it is right; I only question the propriety of not 
going further myself.241 
As Senator Stewart explains to Republican Samuel Pomeroy of 
Kansas, the point of the bill was to ensure that all states were following 
the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically, applying it to the aliens 
in their jurisdictions. He did not want to elevate aliens to the status of 
citizens or to grant them any more rights than they had under the 
Fourteenth Amendment; he simply wanted to ensure they were 
receiving the equal protection that had already been granted to them. 
In the House, Republican Aaron Sargent viewed the proposed 
Civil Rights Act of 1870 in the same manner. He explained during the 
House’s debate on the bill, “I believe, and I have contended for years 
in my own State, that by natural equity, by common justice, the 
Chinaman and any one else, no matter what his color, is entitled to 
the equal protection of our laws in life, liberty, and security.”242 But, 
Representative Sargent continued, “I never have believed that we 
should go beyond that and make them all citizens.”243 
This opinion—that aliens deserved some basic rights and fair 
treatment, but were not to be considered citizens—was held not only 
by members of Congress, but also the public. For example, in 1868 in 
California, there was widespread editorial opposition to the 
abridgement of rights and unfair taxes levied directed at the 
Chinese.244 When the California State Senate voted to repeal a bill 
barring Chinese aliens from testifying in U.S. courts in criminal cases, 
the Daily Alta California “expressed the hope that a bill to permit 
 
 241. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870). 
 242. Id. at 4275. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See McClain, supra note 227, at 560–61. 
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testimony in civil cases would soon follow.”245 Even earlier, in 1857, 
when the ban on Chinese testimony was upheld—after the state 
 
 245. Id. at 561 (citing Editorial Notes, DAILY ALTA CAL., Jan. 24, 1868, at 2). Editorials 
written in support of aliens were not just penned in California. Americans across the country 
supported noncitizens. For example, during the Civil War, a bill was proposed to grant 
naturalization to aliens who fought in the conflict, and this was met with support from citizens. 
Dwight Foster, Attorney General of Massachusetts, wrote in October 1864: 
  Gentleman: In reply to your inquiry as to the law of Congress in regard to the 
naturalization of aliens who have been honorably discharged from the service of the 
United States, the following is the only act of Congress on the subject known to 
me, viz:— 
  “Sec. 21. And it be further enacted, That any alien of the age of twenty-one years 
and upwards who has enlisted or shall enlist in the armies of the United States, either 
the regular or the volunteer forces, and has been or shall be hereafter honorably 
discharged, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, upon his 
petition, without any previous declaration of his intentions to become a citizen of the 
United States, and that he shall not be required to prove more than one year’s 
residence within the United States previous to his application to become such citizen; 
and that the Court admitting such alien shall, in addition to each proof of residence 
and good moral character as is now provided by law, be satisfied by competent proof 
of such person having been honorably discharged from the service of the United 
States as aforesaid.”—[Acts of xxxvii Congress, Sess. II., Chap 200. 
  By its terms you will see that regular naturalization continues to be 
indispensable, but an honorably discharged alien soldier is entitled to be naturalized 
upon proof of one year’s residence in the United States previous to the petition 
for naturalization. 
Dwight Foster, Naturalization of Aliens, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 14, 1864, at 2. 
Citizens of the United States agreed with this law and recognized that the noncitizens fighting 
in a conflict as domestic as the Civil War deserved to become naturalized and gain the rights 
granted to American citizens. Support can also be seen in the Wisconsin State Register. For the 
benefit of its alien population and to express its endorsement of the law, the newspaper reported 
Congress’s consideration of the law under the heading “Important to Aliens,” saying: 
  A bill to permit aliens who have served one year in the army to become citizens 
of the United States, being under consideration in the Senate, an amendment was 
offered that no aliens who had resided in the United States five years previous to the 
19th April, 1861, should be naturalized under the laws of the United States after April 
1st, 1865. This is manifestly just and proper, and we hope to see it become a law.  
Important to Aliens, WIS. ST. REG., Jan. 14, 1865, at 2 (emphasis added). 
Turning our focus back to California, an editorial written after the Civil War in 1866 addressed 
the distinction between an alien’s political and personal rights in the state of California. The 
Daily Evening Bulletin of San Francisco delivered a sentiment that many Americans echoed at 
the time of Fourteenth Amendment ratification: that aliens should be granted the “personal 
rights” of citizens so long as “political rights,” such as running for office or voting, are reserved 
for citizens of the United States. The editorial is framed within the question of rights granted to 
black citizens, but addresses the rights of aliens: 
  We had occasion lately, in referring to a recent decision of one of the Courts of 
the State of Nevada, by which a negro was excluded from sitting on a Jury, to discuss 
the distinction between personal and political rights, and to remark that the Civil 
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legislature defeated a bill that would have reversed the decision of 
People v. Hall246—the Daily Evening Bulletin said, “We regret this 
action, based as it is entirely upon prejudice, and can only express our 
conviction that the period will ultimately arrive when it will be clear 
to all that the law as it stands is mischievous and prejudicial in the 
highest degree to the public interests.”247 Certain members of the 
 
Rights bill, which had recently become a law, was intended to secure, and on its face 
purported to secure, only the personal rights of freedmen, such as the right of 
locomotion, of property, of marriage, and the like, but did not extend to or pretend 
to confer or regulate political rights, such as the right of suffrage and its kindred rights. 
  The Supreme Court of this State has just made a decision upon a subject wholly 
germane to that discussion, and which is based upon the same distinction. By Article 
1, section 17 of the Constitution of California, it is provided that “Foreigners who 
are, or may hereafter become bona fide residents of this State, shall enjoy the same 
rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance of property, as native 
born citizens.” Here certain personal rights are expressly guaranteed to aliens. But as 
to political rights, such as the right to hold office, the Supreme Court, in the recent 
case of Walther vs. Rabholt, hold that aliens have no such political rights. Judge 
Sawyer, delivering the opinion of the Court in that case, says: 
  [“]It may be said, generally, that the right to vote and of eligibility to office are 
political and correlative rights. At common law an alien had no recognized political 
rights. He was permitted to enjoy certain civil rights, but even these were hedged in 
by many restrictions and limitations. * * * Neither a denizen at common law nor a 
naturalized citizen under the statutory law of England can hold office. A juritori an 
alien cannot. And such we understand to be the common law in other states where 
not in any respect modified by constitutional or statutory provisions. And such we 
also understand the law to be with reference to political rights in all civilized countries. 
We know of no constitutional or statuary modification of the common law in this 
State as to the political rights of aliens.[”] 
  This is so strongly and clearly expressed as to preclude any further confusion 
regarding the distinction between personal and political rights; and it will be generally 
conceded that a negro may be protected in his life and property without necessarily 
becoming a voter, as it has already come to be admitted that one may assist in the 
abolition of slavery, and yet not thereby bind himself to marry his daughter to a negro. 
Personal and Political Rights of Aliens, DAILY EVENING BULL., Aug. 1, 1866, at 2 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 246. 4 Cal. 399 (1854). In brief: George W. Hall and two other men were convicted by 
the grand jury of Nevada County for the murder of one Ling Sing. Three Chinese and one 
Caucasian witness testified on the state’s behalf; however, Hall’s counsel appealed on the ground 
that the Chinese testimony was not valid. The Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, 
Hugh C. Murray, reversed the guilty ruling, holding that Chinese testimony had been 
improperly received because of a California criminal statute which said that “[n]o black or 
Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of, or against, any white 
person.” Id. at 399. 
 247. Admissibility of Chinese and Negro Testimony, DAILY EVENING BULL., Apr. 10, 
1857, at 2. 
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Californian public seemed to realize, more so than congressmen or 
state legislators, that the Chinese aliens deserved to be treated fairly. 
After 1870, the equal-protection-means-equal-benefits line of 
thinking and the concept of basic rights for aliens became standard 
practice. Evidence of this trend can be seen in the cases discussed in 
Part III and can also be found in congressional records from the late 
1800s. For example, when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
Republican Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana offered up his 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[T]he question arises upon this clause of the fourteenth amendment 
as to what the power of Congress is in regard to the substantial rights 
and equality of people in the States. The conclusion of this section 
reads thus: 
“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
 I desire to inquire what is meant by “the equal protection of the 
laws” which a State shall not deprive any person of? To what does 
the word “protection” refer? Does it mean that the State shall not 
deprive a man of the equal protection of the law for his person? Will 
any one contend that it shall have a construction so narrow as that? 
Will it be contended that it means that a State shall not deprive a 
person of the equal protection of the law for his property; that it shall 
be confined to that? I submit that when it declares that no State shall 
deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws, it means 
substantially that no person shall be deprived by a State of the equal 
benefit of the laws; that the word “protection,” as there used, means 
not simply the protection of the person from violence, the protection 
of his property from destruction, but it is substantially in the sense 
of the equal benefit of the law; that it is intended to promote equality 
in the States, and it refers to the laws of the States.248 
 Aliens are not made citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
nor are they granted the “privileges or immunities” that citizens 
receive. However, the second clause of section 1 does apply to them, 
giving them equal protection of the laws, as Senator Morton explained 
above. In the late 1860s, Congress realized that various taxes and 
other measures were being levied specifically against aliens across the 
United States (and especially in California), and newspapers began to 
 
 248. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 846–47 (1872). 
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speak out against the discriminatory measures. Congress recognized 
that the states were not following the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and instead were applying the laws unequally to their 
inhabitants; Congress also recognized that there was popular support 
for a more fair treatment of aliens. As such, the Civil Rights Act of 
1870 was written specifically to protect aliens from taxes and other 
measures that Congress thought in 1870 violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Finally, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and then the 1870 Act, the idea of basic civil rights for aliens was a 
constitutional concept. 
F. Public Education: A Right, Not a Privilege 
1. Public education in Texas in 1869 
Critics might counter that a public education is not necessarily a 
right or that it does not fall under the broad categories of due process 
and equal protection. However, while the Federal Constitution is 
silent on the issue of education, many state constitutions during the 
Reconstruction period did indeed have education clauses. In fact, in 
1868, the constitutions of twenty-eight out of the thirty-seven states 
in the Union had “mandatory language which made the establishment 
of free public schools open to all students obligatory.”249 The states 
that provided this access to public education were Alabama,250 
Arkansas,251 California,252 Delaware,253 Florida,254 Georgia,255 
 
 249. Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of 
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 451. 
 250. ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. XI, § 6, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 95 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter SOURCES 
AND  DOCUMENTS]. 
 251. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in ARK. CODE ANN. CONSTITUTIONS 
663 (2004). 
 252. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 456. 
 253. DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. VII, § 11, reprinted in 1 DEL. CODE ANN. 302 (2007). 
 254. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, §§ 1–2, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 361–62. 
 255. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 509. 
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Indiana,256 Kansas,257 Louisiana,258 Maine,259 Maryland,260 
Massachusetts,261 Michigan,262 Minnesota,263 Mississippi,264 Missouri,265 
Nevada,266 New York,267 North Carolina,268 Ohio,269 Oregon,270 
 
 256. IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 3 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 387. 
 257. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. VI, §§ 2–3, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 90. 
 258. LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 158. 
 259. ME. CONST. of 1819, art. VIII, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 323. 
 260. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (enacted in 1867), reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 472. 
 261. MASS. CONST. ch. V, § 2 (enacted in 1780), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 106. 
 262. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 4, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 234. 
 263. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 311. 
 264. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 385. 
 265. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 531. 
 266. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 2, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 275. 
 267. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. IX, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 
250, at 205. 
 268. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 427. 
 269. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 2, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 566. 
 270. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (enacted in 1857), reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 215. 
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Pennsylvania,271 Rhode Island,272 South Carolina,273 Texas,274 
Vermont,275 West Virginia,276 and  Wisconsin.277 
Most importantly for our argument as to Plyler v. Doe, the Texas 
state constitution in effect in 1869, right after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, did include a provision about education. 
Article IX of the 1869 Texas Constitution discusses all details 
regarding education, and section 1 of article IX establishes public 
schools throughout the state, saying: “It shall be the duty of the 
Legislature of this State, to make suitable provisions for the support 
and maintenance of a system of Public Free Schools, for the gratuitous 
instruction of all the inhabitants of this State, between the ages of six 
and eighteen years.”278 Texas could have chosen to say “for the 
gratuitous instruction of all the citizens of Texas,” but it instead used 
the phrase “all of the inhabitants of this State,” which, as we have 
shown, was understood to include both citizens and aliens at the time. 
Granted, by 1876, the constitution did stipulate that schools must be 
segregated, saying, “Separate schools shall be provided for the white 
and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for 
both,”279 but nowhere does article IX address aliens. 
Thus, one year after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which gave equal protection and due process of the laws 
to aliens, Texas guaranteed a free public school education to both 
citizens and aliens, as indicated by the phrase “gratuitous instruction 
of all the inhabitants of this State” in article IX, section 1 of its 
constitution. “Gratuitous” here means “free,” not “unnecessary,” as 
 
 271. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 302. 
 272. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. XII, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 395. 
 273. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 302 
(Franklin B. Hough ed., 1872). 
 274. TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 250, at 310 (ratified in 1869). 
 275. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 41 (enacted in 1793), reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 514. 
 276. W. VA. CONST. of 1861, art. X, § 2, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 250, at 358. 
 277. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (enacted in 1848), reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 392. 
 278. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 279. TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VII, § 7. 
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we understand the word to mean today. Webster defines it as “1. Free; 
voluntary; not required by justice; granted without claim or merit. . . . 
2. Asserted or taken without proof . . . .”280 Similarly, “gratuity” at the 
time was defined as “1. A free gift; a present; a donation; that which 
is given without a compensation or equivalent. 2. Something given in 
return for a favor; an acknowledgement.”281 
At the time, Texas may not have been aware that it was allowing 
the free education of aliens, or there may not have been as large an 
alien community as there is today; however, by using the word 
“inhabitants” instead of “citizens,” it included aliens in its public 
education system whether it wanted to or not. This fact makes it 
difficult for anyone who knows the history detailed above to accept 
the law under review in Plyler. Why, in 1975, did the Texas legislature 
find it necessary to change something that had been a part of its 
constitution for one hundred years?282 Was the influx of illegal aliens 
 
 280. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 517. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Once enacted, Financing of Public School Education, ch. 334, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 
896 (amending TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1972)) read: 
  (a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens 
and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day 
of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available 
School Fund for that year. 
  (b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally 
admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years 
on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be 
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or person having lawful control of him resides at the time 
he applies for admission. 
  (c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit 
into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either 
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not 
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, 
guardian, or person having lawful control resides within the school district. 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1975). 
The specific changes that the 1975 amendment brought on were: In subsection (a), the phrase 
“who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are” was substituted 
for “without regard to color” and the ages “five” and “21” were substituted for the ages “six” 
and “18.” 
In subsection (b), the phrase “who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien 
and who is” was inserted, the age “five” was substituted for the age “six,” and the phrase 
“notwithstanding the fact that he may have been enumerated in the scholastic census of a 
different district or may have attended school elsewhere for a part of the year” was deleted. In 
subsection (c), the phrase “who are either citizens of the United states or legally admitted aliens 
who are” was inserted and the age “five” was substituted for the age “six.” 
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and their children so great that, suddenly, after one hundred years of 
allowing alien children a free public education, the strain was too 
much on the school system? The Reconstruction era was not a 
particularly flattering one for the South, race-wise; why, in 1868, were 
aliens included in public schooling but in 1975, a purportedly more 
accepting time, alien children became a concern? 
2. Plyler v. Doe oral argument  
These questions were addressed, albeit in a roundabout manner, 
during oral argument for Plyler. Richard L. Arnett, arguing on behalf 
of Texas, claimed the statute was justified because the influx of 
nonresident children put a significant burden on the state’s public 
school system:  
When one considers the fact that Mexico’s population is doubling 
approximately every twenty years, and that approximately four and a 
half million children of school age are out of school in Mexico right 
now because of [a] lack of adequate facilities, it doesn’t take a great 
deal of imagination to understand the Texas legislature’s concerns 
for the future.283  
He continued, “The purpose of this statute is to protect the 
Mexican  American population’s education in Texas,” explaining that 
“a district on the border [between Texas and Mexico], Eagle Pass, 
which has a ninety-five percent Mexican American population, 
decided to enact a policy precluding illegal aliens from admission into 
their schools.”284 
According to Mr. Arnett, the districts of Eagle Pass, Brownsville, 
and other “Valley districts” supported section 21.031 because “they 
have also suffered a seven-hundred-percent increase in the last year in 
 
It can be clearly seen from these changes that the 1975 amendment was focused on targeting 
the children of illegal aliens: before the 1975 changes, no mention at all was made of citizenship 
or alienage. One wonders why the change was brought upon so suddenly in 1975—perhaps 
there was a large influx of illegal aliens? There may have also been monetary motivations, 
considering that the public schools’ no-cost nature is emphasized, and it is highly probably that 
many illegal aliens were not paying taxes that helped to keep the public schools “free of tuition.” 
The current version, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001 (West 2011), makes no mention 
of aliens. 
 283. Oral Argument at 1:20, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-1538), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1538. 
 284. Id. at 5:39. 
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illegal alien enrollment.”285 He also contended, “The one interest that 
Texas asserts here which we have predictably met with opposition on 
as to whether that is permissible is that as a subsidiary to protecting 
our resources, we would like to reduce the incentive for illegal 
immigration, particularly of families and of school-aged children.”286  
The Justices seemed to fault this logic, though, cornering Mr. 
Arnett with statements such as “there can’t be any question, can there, 
that an alien, documented or undocumented, brought before a 
criminal court is entitled to the same due process as any other person 
in the United States?”287 And  
does that mean that you assume . . . that these [noncitizen, “illegal 
alien”] children will remain in the school district because it is just 
too much of an administrative burden to get them deported, so they 
are going to be part of the community anyway, and you would rather 
have them uneducated than educated?288  
The Justices did not consider the “strain on Texas resources” 
argument to be a satisfactory justification for Texas’s discrimination 
against the children of noncitizens. 
The other advocate for the appellants, John C. Hardy, argued that 
Texas was correct in denying noncitizen children the right to a public 
education because of their status as nonresidents of Texas. His 
argument—if the noncitizen children “do not have legal resident 
status or domiciliary status legally . . . they cannot attain the resident 
status . . . allowing them to attend school free of charge”—hinged on 
“the classification in the [Texas] statute.”289 “It is not alienage or 
citizenship,” he claimed. “It is between a legal resident and a non-
legal resident, or a residency statute and a non-residency statute.”290  
Hardy then tried to explain that the Texas law “provides that non-
resident citizens and non-resident aliens are both required to pay 
tuition.”291 He made the equivalence that, because “the Court has 
continuously held . . . that in higher education branches . . . a non-
 
 285. Id. at 6:30. 
 286. Id. at 13:12. 
 287. Id. at 4:50. 
 288. Id. at 16:00. 
 289. Id. at 24:11. 
 290. Id. at 24:35. 
 291. Id. at 24:47. 
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resident of the state can be charged a different tuition than a resident 
of the state,”292 they should uphold that same principle for primary-
school education.  
 The Justices, however, were quick to refute this argument, 
pointing out that “before the statute was passed, [the state of Texas] 
received federal funds based in part on the enrollment which included 
illegal, undocumented children.”293 Therefore, it would be “pretty 
hard” for Mr. Hardy to argue “that the federal government has some 
rule” barring alien children from attending public schools “when it 
actually paid” the state of Texas federal funding based, in part, on the 
enrollment of said “illegal, undocumented children.”294  
 The Justices followed this line of questioning by asking whether 
the state of Texas could “deny [the noncitizen children] fire 
protection,”295 to which Mr. Hardy responded, “I think that they are 
afforded all the due process procedures and the other problems that 
are attributable to that. We are not talking about denying them all 
rights. I am talking and attempting to talk about the resident and non-
resident,”296 at which point he was interrupted. The interruption came 
from a Justice contending that “you are talking about denying them 
all rights that every other similarly situated person has, such as fire 
protection, police protection, garbage collection, things like that. You 
could take all those things away, it seems to me, under the state’s 
argument.”297 As demonstrated by the pointed comments from the 
Justices, both advocates for the appellants in Plyler v. Doe struggled to 
provide truly valid reasons for section 21.031. 
Advocates for the appellees endeavored to point out the flaws in 
the appellants’ logic; for example, Peter Schey raised the fact that “the 
state of Texas seems to argue that it is in a highly unique situation and 
they downplay the importance of this problem to states like California, 
et cetera.”298 As Mr. Schey argued, Texas was not the only state facing 
a large influx of noncitizen immigration, therefore its argument that 
 
 292. Id. at 25:12. 
 293. Id. at 26:56. 
 294. Id. at 27:22. 
 295. Id. at 29:06. 
 296. Id. at 30:03. 
 297. Id. at 30:20. 
 298. Id. at 39:12. 
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section 21.031 of title II was created to help preserve resources and 
stop schools’ population from increasing was not a valid one.  
The appellees’ other advocate, Peter Roos, used an approach 
similar to the one we take in this Article to demonstrate why section 
21.031 was unconstitutional. He explained that the Equal Protection 
Clause “is to be contrasted historically with the clause that . . . grants 
privileges and immunities to citizens.”299 He continued by saying that 
the Court has said the Equal Protection Clause “include[s] 
undocumented persons, because they are indeed persons.”300 He then, 
as we have in this Article, set forth a legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing, “The primary framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment clearly thought of, at least in terms of 
coverage, of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
as protecting the same group of people.”301 
Mr. Roos also argued that, based on the language of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “absent the right of coverage under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the state could . . . treat undocumented people arbitrarily and 
irrationally.”302 He then posed a question that we, too, have 
considered: “What would be the limitations upon a state should there 
not be the minimal protection of the Equal Protection Clause?”303 Mr. 
Roos’s bold statement drives home the message that we have sought 
to convey throughout this Article: the Texas statute barring the 
children of illegal aliens from attending public school was 
unconstitutional due to the original framing, conception, and 
application of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Texas could not have made any claim during the oral arguments 
for Plyler vs. Doe that would have proved the 1975 regulation 
constitutional. The original language of the Texas Constitution does 
 
 299. Id. at 1:06:38. 
 300. Id. at 1:06:57. 
 301. Id. at 1:07:26. He even mentions Representative Bingham and Senator Howard: “In 
our brief, we cite to Representative Bingham, who was commonly acknowledged to be the 
author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he spoke of the due process and equal 
protection clauses alike as protecting the citizen and the stranger.” Id. at 1:07:40. 
Likewise, on the floor of the Senate, the floor manager was Senator Howard, and 
Senator Howard spoke of the two clauses in terms of coverage in the same words, and 
spoke of them together, and when he spoke of them, he spoke of them as protecting 
whomever should be within the country. 
Id. at 1:08:32. 
 302. Id. at 1:08:55 (emphasis added). 
 303. Id. at 1:09:17. 
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not exclude alien children from the state’s public school system, and 
in fact covers mainly funding and land usage, except when stipulating 
that segregation is necessary. Of course, article VII had been amended 
since 1876; however, none of those amendments mention alienage. 
Nowhere in article VII are the children of illegal aliens discussed, and 
certainly nowhere in article VII are they barred from attending public 
schools in Texas. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the highest law of the land, provides “persons,” i.e., aliens 
and citizens alike, with due process and equal protection of the laws. 
Therefore, the 1975 statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment—
alien children are “protected” under the Texas Constitution, which 
does not explicitly, or even implicitly, ban alien children from 
attending public schools. 
IV.  OTHER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ALIENAGE CASES 
The preceding Parts establish a new, originalist public meaning 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
have explained how the Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens, both 
legal and illegal, within the United States. We now apply this 
scholarship to other alienage cases in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the basis for the decision. The relevant cases304 are as 
follows: Yick Wo v. Hopkins,305 Truax v. Raich,306 Takahashi v. Fish & 
 
 304. Scholars of immigration and/or alienage case law will notice that a seminal alienage 
case, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), is missing from our discussion. Under 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese noncitizens were required to obtain a certificate of 
residence to continue living in the United States, so when the plaintiff, Fong Yue Ting, did not 
have this certificate, he was arrested. A judge ordered that he be deported immediately, so he 
appealed the decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court (split 6–3) decided that the national 
government had an “absolute and unqualified” right to oversee the immigration process, 
including deportation of immigrants already living in the United States. The dissent stated that, 
while Congress does have the authority to create new immigration requirements, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to any person residing in the country, and 
immigrants should be allowed to challenge a deportation order. We disagree with the decision 
in Fong Yue Ting and believe the dissent to be the better part of the argument. As such, we did 
not want to include this case in our discussion of alienage cases that would be better served 
through an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. See NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 
62, 120–21. 
 305. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (whether Chinese immigrants could operate laundry businesses 
in California). 
 306. 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (whether Arizona could bar aliens from employment). 
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Game Commission,307 Graham v. Richardson,308 Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong,309 Nyquist v. Mauclet,310 and Arizona v. United States.311  
We agree with the outcome of these decisions but believe the 
reasoning of each would have been stronger if articulated using our 
originalist equal protection reading that aliens fall under the category 
of “any person” (according to the 1848 Webster’s Dictionary 
definition of the words “any” and “person”) and have a constitutional 
right to the equal protection of the law and to due process of law.  
We will briefly outline each case and explain how our reading 
better suits the circumstances. In most of these cases, the aliens serving 
as petitioners are “legal aliens” as opposed to Plyler v. Doe’s illegal 
aliens. However, as explained in Part II, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was written, there was no federal concept of legal 
alienage versus illegal alienage. Therefore, we believe that, for our 
argument, the distinction of “legal” versus “illegal” does not matter. 
We are not arguing that the rights that emerged from the following 
cases should be conferred upon illegal aliens; we are simply pointing 
out that each case could benefit from the application of originalism. 
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins  
The earliest case to come before the Supreme Court that dealt 
explicitly with alien rights was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, decided in 1886. 
Yick Wo, a Chinese man living in California, petitioned the Supreme 
Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus after being wrongfully 
imprisoned in San Francisco for violating ordinances.312 The ordinance 
in question established that no person could operate a laundry in a 
wooden building without a permit from the Board of Supervisors, but 
the Board granted no permits to any Chinese person who applied 
 
 307. 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (whether California could deny fishing licenses to individuals 
who are ineligible to U.S. citizenship). 
 308. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (whether Arizona could deny welfare benefits to aliens who had 
not lived in the state for a certain number of years and Pennsylvania could deny welfare benefits 
to any aliens). 
 309. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (whether the Federal Civil Service Commission could bar aliens 
from working for the Federal Civil Service). 
 310. 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (whether New York could require that resident aliens apply for 
U.S. citizenship before becoming eligible for education-based financial aid). 
 311. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (whether four different provisions of an Arizona state law 
were preempted by federal immigration law). 
 312. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1886). 
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while simultaneously denying permits to only one of eighty non-
Chinese applicants.313 Yick Wo was imprisoned for refusing to pay a 
ten-dollar fine, which he incurred for continuing to operate his 
business without a permit.314 The Supreme Court did not deal with 
the writ but instead answered the question of whether the statute was 
discriminatory.315 The Court concluded that the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and struck it down as unconstitutional.316 
Interestingly, the argument that Justice T. Stanley Matthews used 
in his opinion, written for a unanimous Court, is quite similar to our 
originalist approach (due probably to the fact that Carolene Products 
would not be decided for another fifty years). He explained: 
 The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of 
which they complain, are not less, because they are aliens and 
subjects of the Emperor of China. By the third article of the treaty 
between this Government and that of China, concluded November 
17, 1880, 22 Stat. 827, it is stipulated: “If Chinese laborers, or 
Chinese of any other class, now either permanently or temporarily 
residing in the territory of the United States, meet with ill treatment 
at the hands of any other persons, the Government of the United 
States will exert all its powers to devise measures for their protection, 
and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and 
exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most 
favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty.”  
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined 
to the protection of citizens. It says: “Nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” These provisions are universal in their application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal 
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. . . . 
The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, 
therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of 
 
 313. Id. at 359–60. 
 314. Id. at 357. 
 315. Id. at 366–68. 
 316. Id. at 374. 
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the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who 
now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.317 
Justice Matthews recognized in 1886, only twenty years after the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s inception, what we are trying to emphasize 
130 years later—the “any person” language of the Equal Protection 
Clause applies to literally any being living within the borders of the 
United States. He and his colleagues on the Court understood318 that 
the Equal Protection Clause could safeguard aliens as well as citizens 
from the inherently racist and anti-alien sentiment behind the 
California statute. The Court struck the statute down on originalist 
grounds—confirming that the phrase “any person” includes aliens, 
not just “citizens”—and set a precedent for using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to defend alien rights. 
B. Truax v. Raich 
The next major immigration case we address is Truax v. Raich,319 
a 1915 case examining whether a state could bar aliens from 
employment. The state of Arizona passed a law in 1914 that stated: 
Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual 
who is, or may hereafter become an employer of more than five (5) 
workers at any one time, in the State of Arizona, regardless of kind 
or class of work, or sex of workers, shall employ not less than eighty 
 
 317. Id. at 368–69. 
 318. As can be seen near the end of the majority opinion: 
No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why [the Chinese 
laundry owners] should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, 
their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And 
while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred 
others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty 
others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar 
conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and 
the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the 
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law 
is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore illegal, and the public administration 
which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
Id. at 374. 
 319. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
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(80) percent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United 
States or some subdivision thereof.320 
Mike Raich, an Austrian immigrant whom the Supreme Court 
described as “an inhabitant of the State of Arizona but not a qualified 
elector,”321 was fired from his job as a cook by his employer, William 
Truax, after the Arizona law was passed. Prior to the passage of the 
law, Raich had worked for Truax without problem, but after the law’s 
enactment, Truax informed Raich that he would be fired “by reason 
of [the law’s] requirements and because of the fear of the penalties 
that would be incurred in case of its violation.”322 The issue was 
“whether the act assailed [was] repugnant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment,”323 and the Supreme Court ruled that it was.  
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for an eight-Justice 
majority, penned the opinion of the Court. He explained: 
Upon the allegations of the bill, it must be assumed that the 
complainant, a native of Austria, has been admitted to the United 
States under the Federal law. He was thus admitted with the privilege 
of entering and abiding in the United States, and hence of entering 
and abiding in any State in the Union. Being lawfully an inhabitant 
of Arizona, the complainant is entitled under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the equal protection of its laws. The description—
“any person within its jurisdiction”—as it has frequently been held, 
includes aliens.324 
Justice Hughes then cited Yick Wo, discussed above, to prove that 
the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to aliens. He framed his 
argument using the Fourteenth Amendment and explained that 
Arizona could not use “within its jurisdiction” philosophy to justify 
its discrimination against immigrants: 
 It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the 
State to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the 
health, safety, morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But 
this admitted authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion 
that it implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the State 
 
 320. Id. at 35. 
 321. Id. at 36. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 39. 
 324. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the 
ordinary means of earning a livelihood.325 
Moving away from the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Hughes 
stated, “The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude 
aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”326 Since aliens 
“cannot live where they cannot work,”327 “[t]he assertion of an 
authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood 
when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the 
assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode . . . .”328 To 
synthesize the various parts of this argument, Justice Hughes held that 
the Arizona statute was unconstitutional because: a) under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Arizona had to provide for the welfare of 
any persons within its jurisdiction because the Fourteenth Amendment 
was applicable to aliens following the decision in Yick Wo; and b) by 
denying legal aliens the opportunity to work, Arizona was inherently 
denying them the ability to live in the state and was therefore usurping 
the federal government’s authority to “admit or exclude aliens.”329 
While this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is in line with 
our originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, there is 
one major difference between our understanding of the clause and 
Justice Hughes’s reasoning: Mike Raich was a legal immigrant in the 
United States, and as such, the opinion was written to reflect the fact 
that Arizona could not bar legal aliens from finding work in the state. 
Justice Hughes’s opinion, which protects legal aliens under the Equal 
Protection Clause, differs from our interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause because, as we have discussed throughout this 
Article, we believe the Equal Protection Clause protects all aliens in 
this country regardless of their “legal immigration” status.330  
Justice James Clark McReynolds was the lone dissenter—he 
believed that under the Eleventh Amendment the Supreme Court had 
no right to rule in Truax.331 However, that dissent has no bearing on 
 
 325. Id. at 41. 
 326. Id. at 42. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 34. 
 330. See discussion supra Section II.E. 
 331. Justice McReynolds was so firm in his belief that his dissent was only one paragraph. 
He argued that federal courts cannot get involved if a citizen or noncitizen sues a state as a whole 
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whether Arizona’s anti-immigrant employment law was in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. As Justice Hughes and his majority 
brethren explained, Arizona’s refusal to allow immigrants to live 
within its jurisdiction was both a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and a usurpation of the federal government’s authority 
over the admittance of aliens.  
C. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission 
Next on our timeline comes Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Commission, a California case decided thirty-five years after Truax. 
The Court decided the case in 1948—after Carolene Products had 
been penned—but used equal- protection logic similar to our own. 
Torao Takahashi came to the United States from Japan, became a 
resident of California in 1907, and used commercial fishing licenses 
issued by the state to fish for profit.332 In 1943, during World War II 
and a period of intense anti-Japanese sentiment, The California State 
Legislature adopted section 990 of the California Fish and Game 
Code to prohibit the issuance of licenses to the “alien Japanese.”333 
When Takahashi applied for a license in 1945, he was denied. 
The statute was applied unfairly to deliberately harm aliens, 
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Hugo Black delivered 
the majority opinion and explained, in essence, that aliens fall under 
the concept of any person, the argument that we have made 
throughout this Article. He stated: 
It does not follow, as California seems to argue, that because the 
United States regulates immigration and naturalization in part on 
the basis of race and color classifications, a state can adopt one or 
more of the same classifications to prevent lawfully admitted aliens 
within its borders from earning a living in the same way that other 
state inhabitants earn their living.334  
 
entity and decided that Mike Raich had brought suit against Arizona as a whole by questioning 
the constitutionality of its law. However, Mike Raich brought suit against his employer, William 
Truax, Sr., and not the state of Arizona as a whole; as such, the Eleventh Amendment was 
inapposite and Justice McReynolds’s dissent did not hold any water. Arizona’s anti-immigrant 
employment law was clearly in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 332. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1948). 
 333. Id. at 413. 
 334. Id. at 418–19. 
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Justice Black pointed out that “the Federal Government has broad 
constitutional powers in determining” immigration processes, and 
that “Congress, in the enactment of a comprehensive legislative plan 
for the nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and 
naturalization, has broadly provided”335 that “[a]ll persons within the 
jurisdictions of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”336 He continued 
that the congressional statute—and its framing document, the Equal 
Protection Clause—is meant to protect both aliens and citizens: 
The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as 
well as to citizens. Consequently the section and the Fourteenth 
Amendment on which it rests in part protect “all persons” against 
state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of 
alienage or color. The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted 
under its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons 
lawfully in this country shall abide “in any state” on an equality of 
legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.337 
According to Justice Black, California had to grant a fishing permit 
to Takahashi because, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “any 
person” language, the law barring him from receiving a permit failed 
to equally grant permits to non-aliens and aliens who were legally 
within California’s borders.338 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
laws must apply equally to all people, so the California Fish and Game 
Commission’s statute barring only Japanese individuals from obtaining 
a fishing permit was unconstitutional. 
Aside from Justice Black’s majority opinion, Justice Frank Murphy 
wrote a concurrence. Justice Murphy wrote of his concern that “§ 990 
of the California Fish and Game Code, barring those ineligible to 
citizenship from securing commercial fishing licenses, is the direct 
outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry.”339 
Murphy argued that “[t]he statute in question is but one more 
manifestation of the anti-Japanese fever which has been evident in 
 
 335. Id. at 419. 
 336. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1946)). 
 337. Id. at 419–20 (internal citations omitted). 
 338. Again, we are not discussing, disputing, or trying to reconfigure the concept of 
“legal” versus “illegal” aliens in this case or any other. 
 339. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). 
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California in varying degree since the turn of the century,”340 and that 
“[n]o pretense was made that this alternation was in the interests 
of  conservation.”341 
Justice Murphy purported that this racist law was created “to 
discourage the return to California of Japanese aliens,”342 and he used 
this race-based examination of section 990 to conclude that “[t]he 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not 
permit a state to discriminate against resident aliens in such a fashion, 
whether the purpose be to give effect to racial animosity or to protect 
the competitive interests of other residents.”343 To Justice Murphy, the 
racial aspect of section 990 was what violated the Equal Protection 
Clause as opposed to the “discriminatory against aliens” argument 
used in Justice Black’s majority opinion.344 
Justice Stanley F. Reed wrote a dissent joined by Justice Robert 
H. Jackson. Justice Reed believed that California’s anti-immigrant 
fishing law was constitutional for the following reason: 
As fishing rights have been treated traditionally as a natural resource, 
in the absence of federal regulation, California as a sovereign state 
has power to regulate the taking and handling of fish in the waters 
bordering its shores. It is, I think, one of the natural resources of the 
state that may be preserved from exploitation by aliens. The ground 
for this power in the absence of any exercise of federal authority is 
California’s authority over its fisheries. 
 The right to fish is analogous to the right to own land, a privilege 
which a state may deny to aliens as to land within its borders. It is 
closely akin to the right to hunt, a privilege from which a state may 
bar aliens, if reasonably deemed advantageous to its citizens.345 
 The argument that California has sovereign control over its waters 
and its fishing practices carries some weight; however, the question in 
Takahashi was not whether California had the constitutional right to 
regulate the use of its fishing grounds. Rather, the issue was whether 
Takahashi should have been granted a commercial fishing license and 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 424. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 425. 
 344. It is worth noting that Justice Murphy’s conclusion is particularly strong: “We need 
but unbutton the seemingly innocent words of § 990 to discover beneath them the very negation 
of all the ideals of the equal protection clause.” Id. at 427 (emphasis added). 
 345. Id. at 427–28 (internal citations omitted). 
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therefore whether section 990 of the California Fish and Game Code 
was unconstitutional. Justice Reed’s argument was certainly anti-
immigrant in sentiment, but his precedent-based argument regarding 
a state’s ability to provide some rights exclusively for its citizens was 
not necessarily a fallacious one. Justice Reed’s logic was simply 
inapplicable to the facts. 
The purpose of section 990 was to specifically bar Japanese 
immigrants from obtaining commercial fishing licenses. The 
reasoning for this ban was explained as racism in Justice Murphy’s 
concurrence and anti-immigrant sentiment in Justice Black’s opinion. 
Section 990 was not conferring some special privilege upon all 
California citizens, as Justice Reed claimed in his dissent; any non-
Japanese immigrant could still obtain a commercial fishing license. 
Had section 990 discriminated against all immigrants, Takahashi 
would have been a very different case indeed (though, perhaps, still 
unconstitutional if viewed through our understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause). Instead, the statute only targeted Japanese 
immigrants, and thus Justice Reed’s argument—that California was 
following the ideology that “[c]itizens have rights superior to those of 
aliens in the ownership of land and in exploiting natural 
resources”346—is untenable. The discriminatory statute barring 
Takahashi from obtaining a commercial fishing license was clearly in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the law did not apply 
to all persons in California in the same manner. 
D. Graham v. Richardson 
Twenty-three years later, Graham v. Richardson dealt with two 
related anti-alien welfare statutes in Arizona and Pennsylvania.347 In 
Arizona, aliens could obtain certain welfare benefits only after meeting 
a fifteen-year residency requirement, while Pennsylvania denied 
“general assistance” to aliens.348 Carmen Richardson, a legal alien who 
 
 346. Id. at 429. 
 347. 403 U.S. 365, 365 (1971). 
 348. Id. at 366–68. 
This case, from Pennsylvania, concerns that portion of a general assistance program 
that is not federally supported. The relevant statute is § 432 (2) of the Pennsylvania 
Public Welfare Code, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 62, § 432 (2) (1968), originally enacted in 
1939. It provides that those eligible for assistance shall be (1) needy persons who 
qualify under the federally supported categorical assistance programs and (2) those 
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became disabled while living in Arizona, was denied welfare assistance 
because she did not meet the residency requirement;349 Elsie Mary 
Jane Leger was a legal alien from Scotland who had been living in 
Pennsylvania since 1965 but was denied “public assistance” due to her 
alien status.350 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Blackmun, 
the Court declared the statutes unconstitutional because neither 
Arizona nor Pennsylvania could establish a rational basis for creating 
two classes of needy persons—aliens versus citizens.351  
Although Justice Blackmun’s argument was based in Carolene 
Products’ equal-protection logic, he acknowledged that the “any 
person” language of the Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens. He 
stated, “Under traditional equal protection principles, a State retains 
broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable 
basis. But the Court’s decisions have established that classifications 
based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close 
judicial scrutiny.”352  
Given that “classifications based on alienage” are “subject to close 
judicial scrutiny,” Justice Blackmun argued, Arizona’s and 
Pennsylvania’s “restrictions” are, in kind, subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.353 The states both sought “to justify their restrictions” on 
aliens’ eligibility for public assistance “solely on the basis of a State’s 
‘special public interest’ in favoring its own citizens over aliens” when 
distributing “limited resources such as welfare benefits.”354 The Court 
determined that this reasoning failed the rational basis test.355 Arizona 
 
other needy persons who are citizens of the United States. Assistance to the latter 
group is funded wholly by the Commonwealth. 
Id. at 368. 
 349. Id. at 367. 
 350. Id. at 369. 
 351. Id. at 372–73. 
 352. Id. at 371–72 (internal citations omitted). Justice Blackmun even quotes Takahashi, 
saying, “Accordingly, it was said in Takahashi, that ‘the power of a state to apply its laws 
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.’” Id. at 372 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Justice Blackmun wrote: 
  Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public-interest doctrine 
in other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that a State’s desire to preserve limited 
welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify Pennsylvania’s making 
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and Pennsylvania could not use their “desire to preserve limited 
welfare benefits” for their own citizens to justify barring noncitizen 
residents from accessing those benefits.  
This rational-basis argument makes some sense if one understands 
Supreme Court precedent, but the argument is not defensible because 
the term “rational basis” is vague. It is difficult to uniformly define 
what qualifies as a “rational basis” for discrimination, and the 
argument that “classifications based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny”356 means little from a constitutional standpoint. Labeling 
aliens a “suspect class” is arbitrary and therefore does not indicate 
anything about their constitutional rights. One justice might believe 
laws based on alienage worthy of “strict scrutiny,” but another might 
disagree. With our originalist approach, it is much easier to establish 
that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to 
aliens (regardless of “legal” or “illegal” classification) the right to 
equal protection of the laws and then to apply that principle to specific 
situations. In the case of Graham v. Richardson, the two welfare laws 
clearly did not protect aliens in the same manner that they protected 
citizens, and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. This 
originalist argument is much clearer than the rational basis test and 
follows a set of guidelines that can be applied in the same manner to 
similar cases. 
E. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong  
The next case, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,357 was decided under 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was incorporated into the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in Bolling v. Sharpe.358 After 
 
noncitizens ineligible for public assistance, and Arizona’s restricting benefits to 
citizens and longtime resident aliens. 
Id. at 374. 
 356. Id. at 372. 
 357. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 358. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling, decided in 1954, was a civil rights 
case that addressed whether segregated public schools in Washington, DC, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Brown v. Board of Education, decided the same day 
as Bolling, the Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.” Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954). The Fifth Amendment, though, “does not contain an 
225  An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe 
 317 
Bolling, the Fifth Amendment is read in a way that “reverse 
incorporates” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
into the Fifth Amendment under principles of substantive due process. 
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, decided in 1976, “each of the five 
plaintiffs was denied federal employment solely because of his or her 
alienage.”359 Mow Sun Wong, who had worked as an electrical 
engineer in China, was “ineligible for employment as a janitor for the 
General Services Administration” because he was not a citizen of the 
United States.360 He and four other plaintiffs filed suit against the 
Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission, 
complaining that “about 300,000 federal jobs become available each 
year, but noncitizens are not permitted to compete for those jobs 
except in rare situations when citizens are not available or when a few 
positions exempted from the competitive civil service are being 
filled.”361 The issue was whether “the advantage given to citizens 
seeking federal civil service positions is arbitrary, and violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . .”362 In a 5–4 decision, 
the Supreme Court decided that the Fifth Amendment had, in fact, 
been violated. Justice Stevens employed the rational basis, or “levels 
of scrutiny,” test to make this decision, writing,  
 
equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states,” 
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499, so the Court had to find some way to incorporate its new equal 
protection doctrine into a provision that was applicable on the federal level. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both 
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” explaining that “this 
Court has recognized [that] discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due 
process.” Id. (citing for support Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. 
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)). He 
continued his argument using Fourteenth Amendment rational-basis logic, stating, “Segregation 
in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it 
imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.” Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
Finally, he incorporated Fourteenth Amendment thinking into the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause by declaring, “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states 
from maintaining racially segregated public schools [because of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause and the rational basis test], it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id. 
 359. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 91. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 92. 
 362. Id. at 92–93. 
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[i]ndeed, we deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of 
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of 
the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by 
due process. It follows that some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation 
is mandated by the Constitution.363 
Justice Stevens examined the various reasons for these 
discriminatory laws as provided by the Civil Service Commission—
some of which include the claim that “the citizenship requirement has 
been imposed in the United States with substantial consistency for 
over 100 years”364 and reliance on a presidential executive order that 
allowed the Civil Service Commission to establish standards for hiring 
employees.365 He then declared, “[A]ssuming . . . that the national 
interests identified by the petitioners would adequately support an 
explicit determination by Congress or the President to exclude all 
noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests 
cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination 
by the Civil Service Commission.”366  
Justice Stevens reached this conclusion by explaining that “the 
impact of the rule on the millions of lawfully admitted resident aliens” 
was “precisely the same” as the impact of “comparable state rules” 
which the Supreme Court invalidated in Sugarman v. Dougall.367 He 
then went so far as to say that the Civil Service Commission’s rule 
requiring citizenship “deprives its members of an aspect of liberty” 
because the citizenship requirement barred legal aliens from a job with 
the Civil Service!368  
Justice Stevens finished his argument by noting that the legal 
aliens “were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress 
and the President, implemented by the Immigration and 
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 367. Id. The background for the Sugarman case is similar to that of Hampton v. Mow Sun 
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Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General of the 
United States,”369 so any “decision to impose that deprivation of an 
important liberty” had to be made “at a comparable level of 
government” to satisfy due-process requirements.370 Justice Stevens 
held that the Civil Service Commission’s job was not to decide 
whether aliens could reside and work legally in the United States, and, 
therefore, they could not unilaterally bar legal aliens from working for 
the Civil Service.371  
As with the other alienage cases discussed in this Section, we do 
not disagree with Justice Stevens’s decision and believe that 
noncitizens should be hired by the Civil Service Commission and 
allowed to work for the Civil Service. An originalist reading of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, would have been more 
effective. Justice Stevens based his reasoning on a “judicial scrutiny” 
test, which seems to mean that he considered each justification for the 
Civil Service Commission’s discrimination against noncitizens and 
decided, based on those justifications, whether the discrimination was 
constitutional. Justice Stevens never defined what, exactly, the varying 
levels of scrutiny were for purposes of the anti-immigrant 
discrimination present in Hampton, and used only rational-basis ideas 
to explain why Fifth Amendment substantive due process applies to 
noncitizens. His scrutiny-based, argument-by-argument approach 
could be easily torn apart by critics—or any of the four Justices who 
dissented in Hampton—because his logic explaining why the Fifth 
Amendment applies to immigrant citizens is lacking. 
However, Justice Stevens’s final statement, “By broadly denying 
this class substantial opportunities for employment, the Civil Service 
Commission rule deprives its members of an aspect of liberty,”372 
seems more in line with originalist thought. The Fifth Amendment 
reads, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,”373 so by directly addressing the 
 
 369.  Id. at 116. 
 370. Id. If you think this is somewhat of a convoluted argument, we do too! That is why 
we would rather these Equal Protection immigration cases be decided using our originalist and 
textualist approach. 
 371.  Id. If, instead of a “comparable level of government,” id., the Civil Service 
Commission could make the decision to deprive the legal aliens of their liberty to work for the 
Civil Service, that decision was to be “justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that 
agency.” Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1. 
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deprivation of noncitizens’ liberty present in Hampton, Justice Stevens 
made clear that the Civil Service Commission had violated the Fifth 
Amendment. Had he undertaken an originalist reading of the Fifth 
Amendment in the same way we conducted one for the Fourteenth 
Amendment, his opinion would have been much stronger. If Justice 
Stevens had explicitly stated in his opinion that immigrant workers 
qualify as “persons” under the “[n]o person shall” portion of the Fifth 
Amendment, he would have set a clear precedent for future Justices 
to follow: noncitizens are still “persons” for questions of Fifth 
Amendment rights as well as Fourteenth Amendment due process and 
equal protection issues. Instead, he relied on murky, Lochnerian 
rational-basis reasoning to strike down the Civil Service Commission’s 
anti-immigrant regulations, skirting around the issue of Fifth 
Amendment rights as granted to noncitizens. 
F. Nyquist v. Mauclet 
The last alienage case before Plyler v. Doe, was the case most 
factually related to Plyler because it, too, dealt with education. Nyquist 
v. Mauclet374 involved a New York statute that barred certain aliens 
from state financial assistance for higher education.375 A resident alien 
from France named Jean-Marie Mauclet, who was married to and had 
a child with a United States citizen, was denied tuition assistance at 
the State University of New York at Buffalo because he refused to 
apply for U.S. citizenship at the time of his tuition application—he 
wished to reside permanently in the United States but retain his 
French citizenship.376 The Supreme Court recognized that this statute 
was wrongfully discriminatory but based its decision on the rational 
basis test. 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated, “The Court has 
ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are 
‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’”377 The 
phrase “close judicial scrutiny,” as written in Graham v. Richardson 
and interpreted again here, refers to what is, in modern-day 
Fourteenth Amendment scholarship, the “strict scrutiny” 
classification. As explained earlier, the rational basis test asks whether 
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a state has a “rational basis” for making a law perceived as 
discriminatory. Under this test, certain types of discrimination 
merit  certain types of “scrutiny” to determine whether they 
are  unconstitutional.  
Justice Blackmun applied this test in Mauclet and found that, 
because “resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the 
taxes that support the assistance programs,” there is “no real 
unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in 
programs to which they contribute on an equal basis.”378 And if aliens 
can participate equally in programs they pay for, there is no rational 
basis for denying them financial aid to attend a public university. In 
other words, “The State surely is not harmed by providing resident 
aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.”379 If the 
resident aliens had to pay taxes equal to those of citizens, the law had 
to be applied equally to them under the Equal Protection Clause, 
according to Justice Blackmun’s “rational basis” test. 
However, as explained in our discussion of Graham v. Richardson, 
it makes little sense to hinge an argument upon the shaky and easily 
misinterpreted rational basis test. While the Nyquist Court held that 
New York had no rational reason to exclude resident aliens from its 
higher-education tuition-assistance programs, opponents of the case 
could claim that New York had no fiscal responsibility for these aliens 
and that their home country should provide them with tuition aid.380 
Had Nyquist v. Mauclet been decided using our originalist argument—
that in 1866 the Equal Protection Clause applied to aliens and even 
 
 378. Id. at 12. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Justice Blackmun does in fact address this concern at the very end of the decision by 
explaining that resident aliens pay taxes to the United States government, though we still believe 
that he should have just used our originalist method from the start. He says, 
  Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the 
assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an 
equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And 
although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may 
play a role—perhaps even a leadership role—in other areas of import to the 
community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same 
educational opportunity it offers to others. 
  Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal-protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees’ claim that it also intrudes 
upon Congress’ comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. 
Id. 
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today all aliens deserve equal protection of a state’s laws—the Court 
could have explained that the New York statute barring certain aliens 
from state tuition assistance did not equally protect the citizens 
and  aliens “within its jurisdiction,” and, consequently, was 
clearly  unconstitutional. 
G. Arizona v. United States 
Though Arizona v. United States381 took place years after Plyler v. 
Doe, it is a seminal immigration case and should be included in any 
discussion of immigration issues addressed by the Supreme Court. 
The issue in Arizona was a 2010 Arizona state law called the “Support 
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (referred to as 
S.B. 1070). Its purpose was to “establish an official state policy of 
‘attrition through enforcement.’”382 The Court scrutinized four 
provisions of the law: one creating a state offense for being unlawfully 
present in the United States (section 3 of S.B. 1070); a second 
creating a state offense for working or seeking work while not 
authorized to do so (section 5(C)); a third requiring state and local 
officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was 
lawfully arrested or detained (section 2(B)); and a fourth authorizing 
the warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the 
United States (section 6).383 
In a 5–3 decision (Justice Kagan recused herself), the Supreme 
Court held that the first, second, and fourth provisions were 
preempted by federal law, but the third provision was not. Justice 
Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, explained, “The federal 
power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration 
policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations 
for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of 
aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws.”384 He 
noted, “Federal governance of immigration and alien status is 
extensive and complex. Congress has specified categories of aliens who 
may not be admitted to the United States. Unlawful entry and 
 
 381. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 382. Id. at 2497. 
 383. Id. at 2497–98. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to stop these four 
notably anti-immigrant statutes, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision. Arizona then appealed its case to the Supreme Court. 
 384. Id. at 2499. 
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unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses,”385 and 
“[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the 
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 
officials,”386 making Arizona’s attempt to regulate illegal 
immigration within its borders and remove aliens from the United 
States  unnecessary.  
Regarding provision three, however, Justice Kennedy began by 
stating, “Consultation between federal and state officials is an 
important feature of the immigration system,”387 indicating that the 
provision allowing state and local police officers to check the 
immigration status of already-arrested or already-detained individuals 
might be constitutional.  
He continued, “Congress has done nothing to suggest it is 
inappropriate to communicate with ICE [U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement] in these situations, however.388 Indeed, it has 
encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration 
violations.”389 Justice Kennedy said that provision three was not 
preempted by the federal government, but rather “encouraged”: if 
state and local police officers help identify illegal immigrants via 
background checks on individuals they have already arrested or 
detained, that information is useful to the federal government. In 
other words, “The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy 
requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.”390 
 
 385. Id. at 2499–2500. 
 386. Id. at 2500. 
 387. Id. at 2509. 
 388. The word “however” was used here because, as Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority 
opinion, “The United States argues that making status verification mandatory interferes with 
the federal immigration scheme.” Id. Provision three “does not allow state officers to consider 
federal enforcement priorities in deciding whether to contact ICE about someone they have 
detained. In other words, the officers must make an inquiry even in cases where it seems unlikely 
that the Attorney General would have the alien removed.” Id. (citation omitted). Kennedy’s 
argument rests on the fact that, contrary to the United States’ argument, ICE and Congress have 
actually “encouraged” state and local law enforcement to provide information to ICE in order 
to alert ICE to “possible immigration violations.” 
 389. Id. 
 390.  Id. The full quote, which explains “the federal scheme,” is as follows: 
  Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with 
ICE in these situations, however. Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information 
about possible immigration violations. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(g) (10)(A). A federal 
statute regulating the public benefits provided to qualified aliens in fact instructs that 
“no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from 
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Therefore, provision three of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 was constitutional 
even though provisions one, two, and four were not.  
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all concurred in part and 
dissented in part, though each Justice concurred with different 
provisions and wrote his own concurrence. Justice Scalia argued that 
federal law preempted none of the four provisions, stating, “Today’s 
opinion . . . deprives States of what most would consider the defining 
characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the 
sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be there.”391 He 
continued his discussion of sovereignty, saying, “As a sovereign, 
Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons for its territory, 
subject only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or 
constitutionally imposed by Congress. That power to exclude has long 
been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.”392 Justice Scalia then 
embarked on an originalist journey through legislative history and 
legal precedent, declaring, “after the adoption of the Constitution 
there was some doubt about the power of the Federal Government to 
control immigration, but no doubt about the power of the States to 
do so.”393 His focus on state sovereignty was not echoed in the 
concurrences of Justices Thomas or Alito, however. 
Justice Thomas stated that all four provisions of S.B. 1070 were 
constitutional because “there is no conflict between the ‘ordinary 
meanin[g]’ of the relevant federal laws and that of the four provisions 
of Arizona law at issue here.”394 He systematically explained how each 
provision and its corresponding federal laws have the same “ordinary 
meaning” (i.e. “original meaning,” in the sense that we have 
employed that term in this Article). He also addressed the majority’s 
contention that several provisions of the Arizona law were 
preempted—because they “stan[d] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
 
sending to or receiving from [ICE] information regarding the immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” §1644. The federal scheme thus 
leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. 
Id. 
 391. Id. at 2512 (Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 2517. 
 394. Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009)). 
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Congress”395: “[T]he ‘purposes and objectives’ theory of implied pre-
emption is inconsistent with the Constitution because it invites courts 
to engage in freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose 
that roams well beyond statutory text.”396  
Justice Thomas’s unyielding stance did not appeal to Justice Alito, 
who strayed from the path forged by his two fellow dissenters when 
holding in his concurrence that the majority had decided correctly for 
provisions one and three but incorrectly for provisions two and four.397 
Alito agrees that provision three was not preempted because “[t]hat 
provision does not authorize or require Arizona law enforcement 
officers to do anything they are not already allowed to do under 
existing federal law.”398 Similarly, Justice Alito believed provision one 
was also preempted 
by virtue of our decision in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1942). 
Our conclusion in that case that Congress had enacted an “all-
embracing system” of alien registration and that States cannot 
“enforce additional or auxiliary regulations,” id. at 66–67, forecloses 
Arizona’s attempt here to impose additional, state-law penalties for 
violations of the federal registration scheme.399 
However, Justice Alito says, “I part ways on [provisions two and 
four],” and argues that, in his view, both of those provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 were in fact constitutional and not preempted by 
federal law.400 He explains: 
The Court’s holding on [provision two] is inconsistent with De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), which held that employment 
regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, is an area 
of traditional state concern. Because state police powers are 
implicated here, our precedents require us to presume that federal 
law does not displace state law unless Congress’ intent to do so is 
clear and manifest.401 
 
 395. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 396. Id. Here, Justice Thomas’s judicial philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of 
the original meaning of any text, extends not only to Arizona’s S.B. 1070 but to the entire 
“purposes and objectives” theory of federal preemption. 
 397. Id. at 2525 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 398. Id. at 2525 (alteration in original). 
 399. Id. at 2525–26. 
 400. Id. at 2525. 
 401. Id. at 2526. 
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Thus, Justice Alito followed the same federal preemption rhetoric as 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and did not employ the originalist, 
based-in-legislative-history philosophy that informed Justices Scalia 
and Thomas when crafting their concurrences. 
However, all four of these opinions, majority or dissent, are 
lacking something: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Arizona v. United States was not brought to the 
Supreme Court as a question of equal-protection violation—the 
district court issued its preliminary injunction on the basis of federal 
preemption—so it is understandable that the Justices did not base 
their reasoning in equal-protection logic. When employing our 
originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause, though, one arrives 
at the same conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s majority did: provisions 
one, two, and four of S.B. 1070 are unconstitutional while provision 
three is constitutional.  
Provisions one, two, and four each apply the protection of the laws 
in an unequal manner to citizens and noncitizens: S.B. 1070’s 
provision one makes it an Arizona state offense to be unlawfully 
present in the United States, which immediately makes all illegal aliens 
criminals despite the circumstances of their arrival into the United 
States;402 provision two bars all illegal aliens from working or even 
looking for work by criminalizing those actions, while citizens and 
legal aliens are allowed to pursue a vocation; and provision four 
authorizes warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be in the United 
States illegally, robbing the noncitizens of basic rights because of mere 
suspicion instead of substantiated fact. Provision three does provide 
equal protection to both noncitizens and citizens, as it requires state 
and local police officers to verify the citizenship status of anyone who 
might be lawfully arrested or detained, not just aliens (or individuals 
assumed to be aliens). 
Provisions one, two, and four of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 treat 
noncitizens residing illegally in the United States as a separate class of 
people in the eyes of the law, despite our understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause to mean that the equal protection of the laws is 
granted to all persons residing in the United States. This violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that provisions one, two, and 
four are indeed unconstitutional. An originalist reading of the Equal 
 
 402.  E.g., what if a young woman was brought against the border illegally as part of a 
trafficking operation? That young woman would be the victim of a crime—human trafficking—
and not a criminal herself. 
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Protection Clause could easily have substituted for Justice Kennedy’s 
convoluted discussion of precedent and federal preemption that was 
strongly challenged by the three concurring opinions.  
In this analysis of Arizona v. United States, it may seem that we 
are arguing that Arizona (and the federal government) may not treat 
any person differently even if they are not similarly situated. We do 
not wish to argue that point in this Article—our aim here is to prove, 
using originalist theory, that the Equal Protection Clause applies to 
aliens both legal and illegal. We simply wish to apply this line of 
argument to Arizona v. United States as a thought experiment. We 
understand that if the Supreme Court had used the rationale explained 
above, it would have proved a stark departure from current equal-
protection doctrine and could result in hundreds of state and federal 
employment and immigration laws being declared unconstitutional!   
However, we believe that there is value in following the words of 
the Constitution and that there is value in exploring, in an academic 
context, how the exact words of the Constitution might shed new 
light on particular legal questions (and better protect the rights of the 
parties in the cases we have analyzed above). The Constitution is the 
foundational document upon which our country’s entire legal 
framework is built; if state or federal laws stray too far from its words 
and meaning, they should be scrutinized and, potentially, 
struck  down.  
Justice Thomas, a fellow proponent of originalism, agrees with this 
line of thinking. In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American 
Railroads, he argued, “We have too long abrogated our duty to 
enforce the separation of powers required by our Constitution. . . . 
The end result may be trains that run on time (although I doubt it), 
but the cost is to our Constitution and the individual liberty it 
protects.”403 Justice Thomas also quoted Alexander Hamilton, who 
also seems to have agreed with our reasoning: “It may perhaps be said 
that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing 
good ones . . . The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a 
few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of 
preventing a number of bad ones.”404 In using our originalist reading 
of the Equal Protection Clause to “defeat” three provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, we merely want to ensure that the words of the 
 
 403.  135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254–55 (2015).  
 404.  Id. at 1252 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment are being closely followed 
and  build a framework to prevent future “bad” provisions 
regarding  immigration. 
In conclusion, and to turn back to this Article’s purpose, each of 
the cases we have analyzed here involved statutes that violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because they did not apply equally to “any 
persons,” aliens, or citizens, that were “within the jurisdiction” of the 
state that created them. We agree with each case’s outcome. Had all 
of the cases been decided using the argument that we have put forth 
in this Article, however, the rights that each decision granted to aliens 
in the United States would have been much more secure. The rational-
basis defense introduced to Fourteenth Amendment alienage 
scholarship creates a series of classifications that are difficult to follow 
and easy to debate. By contrast, our originalist dissection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment clearly explains how the Equal Protection 
Clause applies to aliens and can be used to protect them from 
questionable statutes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 2010, the late Justice Antonin Scalia said, “My burden is not 
to show that originalism is perfect, but that it beats the other 
alternatives, and that, believe me, is not difficult.”405 We agree with 
Justice Scalia, and hope we have borne that burden well in this Article. 
In the case of alienage, it is difficult to secure constitutional rights via 
judicial interpretivism because the United States’ attitude toward 
aliens is ever-changing—the evolution of federal immigration law over 
time is evidence enough of that. Instead, we believe that courts can 
use originalism instead of judicial interpretivism to secure 
constitutional rights for aliens in the United States, even (and 
especially!) if those aliens are the children of “illegal immigrants.”  
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is immutable, and the 
definitions of the words at the time of the amendment’s framing and 
ratification from 1866–68 cannot possibly change. This immutable 
Fourteenth Amendment text, specifically the Equal Protection Clause, 
applies to aliens; we demonstrated this by using textualism in Part II 
 
 405. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at University of Virginia School of Law Lecture 
Sponsored by the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression (Apr. 
16, 2010), in U. VA. SCHOOL L., (Apr. 20, 2010), http://content.law.virginia. 
edu/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm. 
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and by supporting that textual analysis with legislative history in Part 
III. An originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause will 
withstand the test of time. It is our fervent hope that, whatever 
attitude the United States may take toward aliens in the coming years, 
an originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause will be used to 
protect the rights of both illegal and legal aliens for the 
foreseeable  future.  
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